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Abstract 
Security is an important issue in mobile agent systems. A mobile agent 
can be easily attacked by malicious hosts, especially if it is executed on 
open networks where there is no trusted third party. The works presented 
in this thesis focus on the execution and state tampering problem. Since 
mobile agents are executed on remote hosts, malicious hosts can tamper 
with program states of the agents during execution. It is difficult to prevent 
this tampering attack as the computing resources are provided by the remote 
hosts. 
We have developed a tamper-detect ion protocol to protect the execu-
tion of mobile agents by using cooperating agents. There are two kinds of 
cooperating agents in the protocol: a coordinator to coordinate the tamper-
detection processes; and a detector to perform re-execution on remote hosts. 
They continuously monitor the mobile agent and detect any malicious hosts 
along the mobile agent's itinerary. The detection mechanism of our pro-
tocol is derived from the execution trace approach with code obfuscation. 
The detector contains an obfuscated program which is a transformed ver-
sion of the mobile agent's program. The mobile agent leaves an execution 
trace when it is executed on a remote host. The detector uses the trace to 
perform re-execution and sends the detection information back to the co-
ordinator. The coordinator then checks if there is any tampering attack. 
Compared with existing protocols, our tamper-detection protocol can pre-
serve the asynchronous execution characteristics of mobile agents, and is 
flexible since hosts need only to provide data storage service in order to de-
ploy the protocol. Experimental results show that the overall overheads of 
the protocol is acceptable. Logical verifications conclude that the message 
transmissions of the protocol is secure. 
We have also developed several extensions to our protocol. One of the 
extensions can increase the security strength of the protocol. An extension 
deploying program slicing techniques can speed up the overall detection pro-
cess. Another extension enables the protocol to support multiple identical 
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Mobile agents are software agents with the ability to travel through a net-
work. The term "mobile" means the ability to migrate across the network 
by hopping from platforms to platforms. The term "agent" has no exact 
definition. We usually describe agents by their attributes. Generally, agents 
are software entities with the following attributes [19]: active, autonomous, 
goal-driven, typically acting on behalf of a user or another agent. A mo-
bile agent can migrate from its home platform to another platform with the 
appropriate agent environment [32]. The agent's program will be executed 
on the remote platform rather than on the home platform. The migrated 
mobile agent can also migrate to other platforms across the network. Figure 
1.1 shows the migration characteristics of a mobile agent. 
Piatforms wifh aqent environment 
Home Platform , ' Z 1 
’ Mobile Agent 
、\\、.. ： 一 
\ 、 \ 
Figure 1.1: Migration characteristics of a mobile agent. 
A mobile agent can interact with the components or resources on the 
platforms if it gets their approvals. It can also communicate with other 
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agents on a platform if the platform's agent environment supports multiple 
agents. 
The mobile agent paradigm possesses many advantages (see Section 1.1 
for details); however, security is one of the major obstacles that prevent the 
large-scale deployment of mobile agent systems. Since the codes of mobile 
agents are executed on remote platforms rather than only on the home plat-
form, security concerns arise to protect the agents if the remote platforms 
are malicious. On the other hand, there are threats to security if the mobile 
agent is malicious. It may attack the hosts (platforms) which enable it to 
execute. The security issues will be discussed in later sections. 
Comparing to traditional distributed systems (e.g. RPC, CORBA), the 
mobile agent system faces more security problems due to its agent migration 
ability. Nevertheless, the problems have to be solved in order to enable mobile 
agent systems as a feasible alternative to traditional distributed systems. 
Mobile agent security issues are mainly divided into "host security" and 
"agent security" issues. Among the security issues of mobile agent systems, 
"protecting agents from malicious hosts" is considered as a difficult problem 
18]. This is because a mobile agent's processes are executed at remote hosts. 
It is difficult to prevent the host from analyzing the processes [2]. As a result, 
the host may be able to alter or modify the processes. Solving this problem 
is a critical task to the mobile agent paradigm. 
1.1 Advantages of mobile agents 
A mobile agent has advantages related to its mobility and agent properties 
8] [19]. Significant advantages include the following: 
Reduced communication bandwidth : A mobile agent is sent to a re-
mote host and performs its task there. After completing the task, the 
agent (or only the results) is sent back to the home host. The com-
munication cost is sending and receiving the agent. If a large amount 
of remote server data is needed for processing and the required results 
contain only little information, the communication cost can be reduced 
by sending a mobile agent to the data instead of sending the data to 
the local host. 
Customization : Agents are easier to be customized than servers. It is not 
necessary to install a specific procedure at a server to handle specific 
client service request. Instead mobile agents can be customized to user 
needs, and sent to the server where customized requests are executed. 
This results in more dynamics. 
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Asynchronous task execution : After the home host has sent a mobile 
agent out, the home host can perform its own jobs. Simultaneously, 
the agent is performing tasks at remote hosts. The home host does not 
need to take care of the agent until the agent comes back. 
These advantages makes the mobile agent paradigm very attractive es-
pecially in systems where network bandwidth is low or network connection 
cost is high; and for applications where remote data to be processed is vast 
or the task to be performed is time-consuming. 
1.2 Security 
Security is an important issue for mobile agent applications, especially for 
electronic commerce. We divide the security issues into two sub-issues: host 
security and agent security. 
Host security refers to problems about malicious mobile agents. They may 
migrate to remote hosts and intrude, for example, changing system settings, 
steal private information, destroy important information of the hosts, etc. 
Trojan Horses are well-known attack programs [9]. Since the hosts may 
continuously accept agents and execute them, one may keep sending mobile 
agents to explore security loopholes of the hosts. The host security problems 
also exist in other mobile code systems, therefore they have been well-known 
since the early times. Popular solution approaches include authentication, 
authorization and verification of code integrity. 
Agent security refers to problems about malicious hosts. Since the agent 
is executed in the environment provided by remote hosts, the hosts can take 
complete control of the code, states and data of the agent. If the system is 
closed and all hosts are trusted, the agent should be safe. However, if the 
system is open and the host is not trusted, the host may be malicious and 
attack the agent. [31] [10] illustrate a number of possible attacks. Major at-
tacks include: unauthorized modification of code, extraction of valuable data, 
denial of execution, and execution tampering. The agent security problem 
only occurs in mobile agent systems. Our research focuses on solving the 
problem of execution tampering. 
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis focuses on the problem of state (or execution) tampering to mo-
bile agents by malicious hosts on open networks. Our contributions can be 
summarized as the followings: 
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1. We have developed a tamper-detection protocol (refer to Chapter 5) 
to solve the problem. Compared with existing protocols, our protocol 
is more flexible and suitable on open networks where no trusted third 
party exists. Moreover, mobile agents pay only little overhead when 
using the protocol. 
2. We have developed several extensions to the protocol (refer to Chapter 
8, 9, 10, 11) to enhance the protocol in certain aspects. The aspects 
include security, efficiency and scalability. Reasonable trade-offs are 
needed to deploy the extensions. 
3. We have verified the protocol using a formal logic, BAN logic (refer 
to Chapter 6). From the verification, we can conclude that message 
transmissions of the protocol are secure. 
4. We have conducted some experiments to evaluate the protocol (refer 
to Chapter 7). We can observe the performance of the protocol from 
the experiments. 
I.4 Structure 
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we describe the problem of 
tampering attack. In Chapter 3 we present several existing approaches to 
protect mobile agents from malicious hosts. In Chapter 4 we give a brief 
description about techniques related to our proposed protocol, for example, 
code obfuscation. In Chapter 5 we describe and discuss the proposed security 
protocol. In Chapter 6 we verify the protocol using formal logic. In Chapter 
7 we present some experiment results of the protocol. In Chapters 8, 9, 10, 
I I , we describe several extensions which can enhance the protocol in certain 
aspects with some trade-offs. We conclude the thesis in Chapter 12. 
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Chapter 2 
The Problem of Execution 
Tampering Attack 
2.1 Mobile agent execution model 
In this paper, we assume that mobile agents (MAs) possess the execution 
model as shown in Figure 2.1: 
i^^me Hostl Host 2 Hostn 
Host “ ! _ _ _ _ 
input input input 
Migration ” Migration ” Migration ,, 
Agent creation ^ Execution Execution Execution p- Home 
Figure 2.1: Mobile agent execution model. 
A MA is created at its home host. It consists of code, data, and program 
states. To perform tasks, the agent will migrate to {hosti,host<2”.., hostn}. 
On each host, the MA's code is executed. Upon execution, with MA's initial 
states and input from the host, MA's result states are generated. The result 
states will become the initial states on the next host. The input represents 
all data outside the MA. When the MA finishes execution on the final host, 
it migrates back to the home host. 
2.2 Tampering attack from malicious hosts 
When a MA migrates to a host, its code, data, and program states are under 
the host's control. A malicious host may try to alter the MA's code, data 
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or states to benefit itself [27]. Therefore we need mechanisms to prevent or 
detect tampering with MA from malicious hosts. Modification of an agent's 
code, and thus the subsequent behavior of the agent on other platforms, can 
be detected by having the original author digitally sign the agent's code. 
Detecting malicious changes to an agent's state during its execution or the 
data an agent has produced while visiting a compromised platform does not 
yet have a general solution [13 . 
For example, a shopping MA has a variable < visited^ites > to store 
the list of seller website addresses it has visited in the current journey. If 
the MA is executed on a malicious seller host, the seller host may append its 
competitors' website addresses to < visited jites > during execution of the 
MA. In this way, the host suppresses the MA from visiting its competitors. 
Since the states of the MA have to be loaded to the host for MA's execution, 
the malicious host can gain access to the states directly. Moreover, the host 
may tamper with MA's states as mentioned in our example. 
2.3 Open network environment 
A popular example of an open network environment is the Internet. On 
an open network, the environments and settings of the hosts can be different 
from others. The network is exposed to other hosts outside the network. And 
the open network is dynamic since hosts can join or detach from the network 
any time. The mobility and automation characteristics of mobile agents are 
suitable for application on open networks. Mobile agents can perform tasks 
on hosts of various functionalities, e.g., sales, consultation, trading, etc. 
Therefore, we propose a flexible tamper-detection protocol for mobile 
agents which is suitable for open networks. The protocol does not require 
a trusted third party. This means that no additional server is required to 
deploy the protocol. In addition, since hosts need not to install services to 
support the protocol, it is flexible for hosts to deploy the protocol. The hosts 
only need to provide data storage for mobile agents, and enable them to 
communicate with mobile agents on other hosts. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Execution tampering is an important problem in mobile agent security. The 
problem does not exist in traditional distributed systems but mobile agent 
systems. This is because mobile agents are autonomous entities which are ex-
ecuted on remote hosts to perform tasks. If their executions are tampered by 
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malicious hosts, they will perform the tasks incorrectly. And some malicious 
hosts may benefit from this. 
Mobile agents are particularly suitable on open networks like the Internet 
due to their mobility and asynchronous execution characteristics. We pro-
pose a flexible tamper-detection protocol to protect mobile agents on open 
networks. The protocol detects if the execution and program state of a mobile 
agent have been tampered by a malicious host. Deployment of the protocol 
needs no additional server and service installations on hosts. Therefore it is 
flexible and suitable on open networks. 
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Chapter 3 
Existing Approaches to Solve 
the Execution Tampering 
Problem 
3.1 Introduction 
To solve the execution tampering problem, there are three main broad ap-
proaches in protecting agents from malicious hosts [25]: 
Trusted execution environment : This approach ensures that the exe-
cution environment for the agent to execute is known to be safe. In this 
way, the agent needs not to worry about any attacks. A closed system 
is an example. All hosts in the system are trusted. The utilization of a 
trusted hardware computing base can also provide a trusted execution 
environment [8]. 
Tamper-detection : This approach is to detect whether a mobile agent has 
been attacked along its journey. This is usually done by checking code 
integrity, result ranges, execution time, etc. Cryptographic execution 
trace technique can be used to keep track of the agent's execution along 
its journey [30 . 
Tamper-prevention : The object of this approach is to make tampering 
of agents difficult. To achieve the goal, many different techniques have 
been suggested. For example, blackbox technique[10], mess-up algo-
rithms, introducing noise code [21], co-operating agents [24], etc. 
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3.2 Trusted execution environment 
3.2.1 Closed system 
migration 
encryption • decryption T rus ted Hos ts 
Z 一 、 ； 
Home Platform ^ ^ ^ ， 
® |卜 J 
Mobile Agent • ^ ‘ 
\ 丨—^ 
Figure 3.1: Closed system. 
It is an effective way to ensure the security of a mobile agent system if 
the system is built as a closed system. This means all hosts in the system are 
well-known to each other and are trusted that agents are safe to be executed 
on them. The mobile agents only migrate to these trusted hosts. Since it 
is sure that no host is malicious, there is no need to protect the agents. To 
exclude network-level attack, the agents may be encrypted during migration 
from hosts to hosts. Figure 3.1 shows an illustration of a closed system. 
Unfortunately, many mobile agent systems are not closed system. For 
example, a very potential application of mobile agents is shopping agent. 
A user sends a shopping agent to the Internet to shop in virtual stores. It 
is not likely for the user's host and other virtual stores to form a trusted 
network. Moreover, open systems are more and more important nowadays 
due to its extensibility and flexibility. Therefore, we have to study other 
security approaches that work in open systems. 
3.2.2 Trusted hardware 
There are some studies of using hardware to provide a trusted computing 
base in mobile agent systems [33] [8]. The idea is to install hardware devices 
on the hosts to execute mobile agents. Since hardware cannot be modified by 
software attack, it should be safe to execute agents on the trusted hardware 
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even if the hosts are malicious. Since the agents are executed in the devices 
which are not controlled by the hosts, the hosts can not read the code and 
data of the agents if the agents are encrypted. 
Stefan Funfrocken [8] described using Java Card to protect mobile agents. 
The Java Card is a card with a processor which offers a Java virtual machine. 
Therefore the card can execute the code of a mobile agent if the code is 
written in Java. The cards are installed on the hosts which want to provide 
an agent environment for correspondent mobile agents. They act as trusted 
computing bases for the agents. This means executions of the agents are not 
performed on the hosts' processor but on the Java cards. 
To protect mobile agents, the system has to meet some criteria: 
• The card must support encryption and decryption. 
• There has to be a certification authority. 
• The code parts inside the card must be managed. 
When an agent migrates to a host with a certified card, it sends its en-
crypted code and data to the card. The code and data are encrypted because 
the host may be malicious. The card needs to decrypt them and execute the 
code. The card should be issued by a certification authority so that it pos-
sesses the key to decrypt the code. After the execution is finished, the card 
encrypts the code and data, and sends them back to the agent. Figure 3.2 
shows the mechanism. By this mechanism, even if the host steals the agent's 
code and data, it cannot decrypt them without the correct key. 
^ 
Code. Java Card 
Mobile Aaent Data ^ ^ 
^ ~ 1. Decrypt 




Figure 3.2: Mechanism of using Java Card as trusted computing base. 
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This approach can ensure high security of the mobile agent system. How-
ever, it has weaknesses similar to the closed system approach. It is harsh 
for all hosts to have to install the trusted hardware in an open system. This 
limits the number of hosts the agents can travel to even if the hosts are not 
malicious. 
The processing power of trusted hardware is also critical. It is obvious 
that a host's computing power should be higher than the add-on trusted 
hardware (e.g. Java Card). This induces that the agents are forced to have 
worse performance. 
3.3 Tamper-detection 
3.3.1 Execution tracing 
Giovanni Vigna [30] described an approach to detect tampering based on 
execution tracing and cryptography. The approach is to trace the execution 
of a migrating agent. Such traces can be used as a basis for problem execution 
verification, i.e. for checking the agent program against a supposed history 
of its execution. If there is tampering, cryptographic tracing allows the agent 
owner to prove that the operations the agent is accounted for could never 
have been performed. 
There are some limitations on this approach. First, the execution trace 
could be very large even if compressed. It is proportional to the code com-
plexity and the number of hops of the agent in a journey. 
Second, the proposed approach can only deal with single threaded agents 
only. In reality, programs may be multi-threaded. An extension of this ap-
proach is needed to solve this problem. 
Fritz Hohl [11] developed a protocol based on the trace approach. The 
basic idea of the protocol is to modify the trace approach such that the 
execution of a mobile agent on a previous host is checked on the next host 
in every session. The checking process deploys the re-execution mechanism 
described in [30]. Figure 3.3 shows the re-execution mechanism of Hohl's 
protocol. 
In Hohl's protocol, the performance of the MA is weakened since every 
host needs to perform re-execution to check the MA's previous computation 
before executing the MA. The MA is basically idle until checking is finished. 
Second, since the tamper-detection process is performed by remote hosts, the 
hosts need to install services to run the detection process. If the hosts are 
already supporting environment of a mobile agent system, then the infras-
11 
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Figure 3.3: Re-execution mechanism in Hohl's protocol. 
tructure of the system needs to be modified accordingly in order to deploy 
the protocol. This is not flexible to implement the protocol on old systems. 
In this paper, we propose a new security protocol which can overcome the 
above problems while providing fast tamper-detection for the MA system. 
3.4 Tamper-prevention 
3.4.1 Blackbox security 
The idea of blackbox security [10] is to generate an agent abstraction in which 
the code cannot be read by the host even during execution. An agent is a 
blackbox if the code and data of the agent specification cannot be read nor 
modified at any time. 
This approach is similar to cryptography, but the target is to hide the code 
specification rather than the data. Tomas Sander and Christian Tschudin de-
scribed the protocol as computing with encrypted functions and data. With 
the protocol, an agent specification can be first converted into an encrypted 
executable agent. When the agent migrates to a remote host, the host needs 
to execute the agent according to the protocol. Since the agent is encrypted, 
the host cannot read the agent directly. Figure 3.4 illustrates the blackbox 
approach. 
Unfortunately, there is a fatal restriction of this approach: currently only 
polynomial and rational functions can be used for this approach. This is also 
the restriction of the encrypted functions computing protocol. Therefore, 
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Figure 3.4: Mechanism of using Java Card as trusted computing base. 
programs are needed to be checked before using this approach. However, it 
is very rare to see programs which consist only of polynomial and rational 
functions. This restriction makes the approach unrealistic. 
If the restriction can be overcome, this approach has the advantage that 
the protection of agent is easily provable and the costs of the protection are 
probably small. 
3.4.2 Time limited blackbox 
Fritz Hohl [10] proposed the time limited blackbox approch based on the idea 
of a blackbox. Since a permanent blackbox cannot be achieved currently, the 
time limited blackbox approach is proposed instead. 
The property of a time limited blackbox is defined as: 
an agent is a blackbox if: 
For a certain known time interval 
1. code and data of the agent specification cannot be read 
2. code and data of the agent specification cannot be modified 
3. attacks after the protection interval are possible, but these attacks do 
not have effects 
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The key in this approach is the introduction of an expiration date. When 
an agent migrates to a host, an expiration date is calculated and stored. This 
approach assumes that the host is not able to modify the agent before the 
expiration date, i.e. the agent is non-modified before the date. When the 
agent hops again to another host, the new host compares the current date 
with the expiration date. If the expiration date has not passed, it can assume 
that the agent has no problem, i.e. valid. Otherwise, the agent may have 
been modified by a malicious host. 
Agent mess-up algorithms are used to emulate a time limited blackbox. 
The task of a mess-up algorithm is to generate a new agent out of an original 
agent, which differs in code and data representation but have the same re-
sults. In this way, a host cannot directly read the agent specification unless 
it is able to rearrange the agent into its original form. It is possible for the 
host to spy on the code successfully. However, an amount of time is needed 
to do it. Therefore, the expiration date is set accordingly and a time limited 
black box is generated in this way. Figure 3.5 illustrates the time limited 
black box approach. 
Home platform 
Agent specification Blackbox Agent 
Remote Host 
Blackbox Agent 
check expiration set expiration 广 " N , 
J 
Figure 3.5: Time limited blackbox approach. 
There are some drawbacks to this approach. First, it is not easy to 
determine appropriate expiration dates. The protection intervals have to be 
long enough for the agent to finish its tasks. However if the period is too long, 
the agent may be attacked successfully by a malicious host. It is also difficult 
to predict how much time a malicious host needs to attack an agent. Second, 
14 
in order to compare the expiration dates with current dates, synchronized 
clocks are necessary. Third, the agent needs to perform mess-up again after 
some period because a host may obtain the original agent specification from 
the blackbox agent after the expiration time, and then send the information 
to other hosts. 
3.4.3 Agent mess-up 
As mentioned in Section 3.4.2, mess-up algorithms can be used to generate a 
new agent out of an original agent so that they are different in code and data 
representation but produce the same results. This can increase the attack 
costs if a malicious host has already known the original agent specification. 
Since the code organization is changed, the host needs to analyze the agent 
again if it wants to modify the code. 
There are various mess-up algorithms. Three examples [10] are vari-
able re-composition, conversion of control flow elements into value-dependent 
jumps, and deposited keys.Agent mess-up is not difficult to implement. Java 
also supports code mess-up. The protection ability can be adjusted by choos-
ing different mess-up algorithms. However, counter attacks exist against the 
algorithms. They can work effectively if the choice of mess-up algorithm is 
known. Therefore using multiple different algorithms can provide stronger 
protection. 
3.4.4 Addition of noisy code 
Adding noisy code [21] could also increase the attack cost of a malicious 
host. This approach is to disrupt the malicious host when it tries to locate 
important code of the agent. The following is a simple example: 
original code 
int new_price; 
new 一 price = get 一 price(); 
if (new_price > max.price) 
max_price = new_price; 
after adding noisy code 
int new_price; 
int new_price2; 
new_price = get—price。； 
new_price2 = get_price(); 
if (new_price > max—price) 
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max_price = new一price; 
if (new_price2 > max_price2) 
max_price2 二new_price2; 
The example is a program segment that compares a new price with the 
maximum price. It simply adds a set of dummy code similar to the original 
code. If a malicious host wants to modify the price comparing code, it will 
not be sure of the exact code location. The host may take a guess. The 
probability of a correct guess depends on the amount of dummy code. The 
probability in the example is 0.5. The more the dummy codes, the lower the 
probability. 
This approach has some drawbacks. First, the noisy code (dummy code) 
would decrease efficiency of the agent by increasing computation time and 
resources. The penalty increases if stronger protection is to be achieved. 
Second, a malicious host may simply modify all the codes which are likely to 
perform important tasks. In this situation, this approach has no protection 
effect. 
3.4.5 Co-operating agents 
Set A SetB 
A Host in Set A A Host in Set B 
Mobile Agent Mobile Agent 
- O 
A l thenticaticn Chann =1 ( j — 
Figure 3.6: Co-operating agents approach. 
Volker Roth [24] proposed an approach to use mutual co-operating agents 
to protect each other from malicious hosts during recording of itineraries. 
The general idea is to split critical tasks and data between two co-operating 
agents. When an agent migrates to a host and is to execute, it needs to set 
up an authenticated communication with the co-operating agent first. The 
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co-operating agent would perform some critical tasks for its partner and keep 
monitoring the other's itinerary (Figure 3.6). In this way, no single agent can 
perform all the tasks alone. The approach sets up two conditions to ensure 
that the agents are under protection: 
• The two agents travel on two non-intersecting sets of hosts 
• No malicious host of either set is willing to co-operate with a malicious 
host of the other set . 
With these conditions, even if an agent is tampered by a malicious host, 
the agent cannot function alone. And the co-operating agent can detect 
the attack if the attack causes the agent migrating in a wrong route (the 
approach was proposed to record itineraries). 
This approach has some drawbacks. First, it is costly in terms of oper-
ation time to set up the authenticated communication channel for each mi-
gration. Second, the approach has not handled the case if one of the agents 
is killed. Third, the condition of no cross-set co-operation of malicious host 
is difficult to prove or verify. Fourth, the decomposition of critical tasks may 
not be easy to be done automatically. This greatly limits deployment of this 
approach. Fifth, an agent may be modified by a malicious host in a way that 
the co-operating agent cannot detect. 
3.5 Conclusion 
There are three main approaches to solve the execution tampering problem: 
trusted execution environment, tamper-detect ion, and tamper-prevention. 
Trusted execution environment approach aims to ensure safe execution envi-
ronment in the first place. This approach needs closed network or tamper-
proof hardware. Tamper-detect ion aims to detect if the executions or states 
of mobile agents are tampered. Vigna's execution tracing [30] is a popular 
technique but the detection is performed when the mobile agents are back to 
the home host. Our tamper-detection protocol is built upon the execution 
tracing technique but detection is performed just after a mobile agent finishes 
execution on a host. Tamper-prevention aims to prevent mobile agents from 
execution tampering. Popular techniques used are code cryptography and 
code obfuscation. However, both techniques cannot prevent unintentional or 




of Our Protocol 
4.1 Introduction 
In our tamper-detection protocol, the detection mechanism needs to deploy 
two computing techniques. They are execution tracing and code obfuscation. 
Execution tracing is used to make a record of the information of the execu-
tion steps. Code obfuscation is used to transform a piece of code into one 
which is functionally identical but with different program statements. The 
detection mechanism in our protocol uses an original program to generate an 
execution trace and uses its corresponding obfuscated program to perform a 
re-execution. The rationale of this approach will be described in Chapter 5 
which shows our tamper-detection protocol. In this chapter, we will describe 
how the tamper-detect ion mechanism can be achieved. 
4.2 Execution tracing 
In Section 3.3.1, we have briefly introduced Giovanni Vigna's approach based 
on execution tracing to detect tampering. In our tamper-detect ion protocol, 
the detection mechanism is based on execution tracing and code obfuscation. 
We will describe code obfuscation in Section 4.3. 
The basic idea of execution tracing is to record information of an exe-
cution. The information is called an execution trace. In Giovanni Vigna's 
execution tracing approach, the trace is composed of a sequence of pairs of 
< > where n represents a unique identifier of a statement, and 5 is a 
signature [29]. A code segment is composed of a sequence of statements. For 
statements which change the values of internal variables by inputs of external 
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variables, there are corresponding signatures in execution trace. The signa-
tures contain the information of the inputs of external variables. We show 
an example in the following. 
A mobile agent reads price p r z c e J on shop shopJ and compares the price price J 
with the best price best—price it can get. The code segment shows the sequence 
of statements and corresponding identifiers. 
code segment (pseudo code)of the mobile agent: 
1 : connect database on shop J 
2 : read price-i from database 
3 : if price-i is less than best jprice 
3.1 : best-price = price J, 
3.2 : best shop = shop J 
4 : set shop J to next shop in shop list 
5 : go shop-I 
Assume that there is no tampering, after execution we can obtain the follow-
ing trace: 
execution trace without tampering: 
(Assume that the initial value of bestjprice is 8.) 
1 : 




(Result value of bestjprice is 8.) 
The execution trace shows the sequence of execution. The numbers represent 
the identifier of program statements. In Statement 2 of execution trace, the 
statement reads a value of external variable. Therefore the signature part shows 
the input value. Statements 3.1 and 3.2 do not appear in execution trace since 
price J, is not less than bestjprice. 
By the trace, re-execution is performed in the following sequence: 
(Assume that the initial value of bestjprice is 8.) 
1 : 





(Result value of best—price is 8.) 
Since the result state of original execution and that of re-execution are the same, 
we can conclude that there is no tampering to the agent's execution. 
On the other hand, we assume that the host is malicious this time. The malicious 
host tampers with the agent's execution by changing the value of best jprice into 
100. We will get the following execution trace. 
execution trace with tampering 
(Assume that the initial value of best .price is 8.) 
1 : 
2 : price J 二 10 






(Result value of best—price is 10.) 
Since value of bestjprice is tampered into 100 during execution, price_i is less 
than best-price when executing Statement 3. Therefore statements 3.1 and 3.2 
appears in execution trace. 
By the trace, re-execution is performed in the following sequence: 
(Assume that the initial value of bestjprice is 8.) 
1 : 




(Result value of best—price is 8.) 
In re-execution, the value of best—price is not tampered. Therefore price J is 
not less than bestjprice when executing Statement 3. And the result value of 
bestjprice is 8 not 10. Since the result states of original execution and that of 
re-execution are different, we can conclude that there is tampering to the agent's 
execution. 
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In the example, we have demonstrated how to detect tampering using 
execution tracing. If there is tampering to the agent's execution, we can 
observe a difference between the result states of the agent's execution and 
that of re-execution. On the other hand, if there is no tampering, the result 
states should be the same. 
4.3 Code obfuscation 
The purpose of code obfuscation is to transform a piece of code into one 
that is functionally identical to the original but which is much more dif-
ficult for human or machine to learn. A code obfuscator is based on the 
application of code transformations, in many cases similar to those used by 
compiler optimizers. We can evaluate the transformations with respect to 
their potency (the degree a human reader is confused), resilience (the ability 
to resist automatic deobfuscation attacks), and cost (the overhead added to 
the application) [6 . 
transformation se^ d 
_ J O動cator I 二 ， 过 
Object Code • ^ | Object Code 
Figure 4.1: Obfuscation of object code. 
Figure 4.1 shows an overview of obfuscating a piece of object code into 
an obfuscated object code. The object code can be a program written in 
programming languages like C / C + + or Java. Due to different structures 
of different languages, the obfuscator is dependent on the language of the 
object code; that is, a program written in Java must use a Java obfuscator. 
The obfuscator performs obfuscating transformation on the original object 
code and generates a piece of obfuscated code. Figure 4.2 is an example of 
obfuscating transformation provided in [6]. It uses loop blocking transforma-
tion to generate a piece of code which is more difficult to understand than 
the original one. There are many other methods for obfuscating transforma-
tion. An obfuscator usually can perform several different transformations. 
6] provides a detailed survey on this issue. The transformation seed usually 
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is a random generated number. It is used to control the transformation pa-
rameter values and pattern. With different seeds an obfuscator can generate 
different obfuscated codes from a single object code. 
for (l=1,l<=n,l+=64) 
for (i=1 .i<=n.i++) for (J=1 .J<=n,J+=64) 
for (j=1 . j<=nj++) _ for (i=l.i<=min(l+63,n).i++) 
啡 _ = = 二 for G=J’j<=min(鳩+) 
a[ l , j ]=bP 
Figure 4.2: An example of obfuscating transformation. 
In our tamper-detection protocol, code obfuscation is deployed to con-
fuse the hosts during execution trace checking. The details are described in 
Chapter 5. Since the target to confuse is the remote hosts, an obfuscator 
with high resilience is suitable for our protocol. 
4.3.1 Resilience of obfuscating transformation 
Resilience of an obfuscating transformation indicates the transformation's 
ability to confuse an automatic deobfuscator. An important factor to re-
silience is deobfuscator effort. Deobfuscator effort represents the execution 
time and space required by an automatic obfuscator to reduce potency of the 
transformation. It can be classified as either polynomial time or exponential 
time [6 . 
In our tamper-detection protocol, obfuscated code is used to confuse ma-
licious host during re-execution process. Therefore our protocol requires 
obfuscating transformations which have high resilience such that deobfusca-
tor effort is exponential time. In this way, a malicious host needs to take a 
very long time to perform deobfuscation. This is similar to data encryption. 
And our protocol assumes that a host is malicious if the re-execution process 
takes too long a time. By selecting suitable obfuscating transformation, a 
malicious host cannot bypass tamper-detect ion with deobfuscation. 
The complexity of structures of an obfuscated program can affect the 
time for deobfuscation. An obfuscated program composed of more control 
structures and variables usually requires more time to be deobfuscated. We 
assume that the programs of mobile agents are composed of numerous con-
trol structures and variables. As a result, there are many permutations for 
obfuscating transformations to obfuscate the programs. If the programs of 
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mobile agents have very few control structures and variables, the permuta-
tions of obfuscating transformations would become much fewer accordingly. 
And a malicious host can deobfuscate the program using only little effort. 
4.4 Execution tracing with obfuscated pro-
gram 
In our tamper-detection protocol, execution tracing is a component of the 
detection mechanism. However, we do not directly use the traditional tracing 
mentioned in Section 4.2. In our detection mechanism, an original program is 
executed and the corresponding trace is generated. In the re-execution pro-
cess, we use an obfuscated program (transformed from the original program) 
instead of the original program. The statements in the obfuscated program 
can be different from that in the original program. But the obfuscated pro-
gram and the original program are functionally identical. Their sequences 
to read external variable inputs are the same. Therefore re-execution by 
the obfuscated program can still use the trace from execution of the original 
program. 
However, since the statements of the obfuscated code are different from 
that of the original code and the number of variables of the two codes can be 
different, the identities of states of the obfuscated program are different from 
that of the original program. The obfuscated program and original program 
are the executables generated from the obfuscated code and the original 
code respectively. The identities of states are the names of variables in the 
programs. To detect tampering by execution tracing using obfuscated code, 
we need to generate an "identity mapping" table during code obfuscation 
and compile-time. The "identity mapping” table records pairs of identities 
of corresponding states in the obfuscated program and the original program. 
Using the table, we can compare the states of the obfuscated program to that 
of the original program. 
In the following we show an example. 
Original code segment 
1 : read (price J ) 
/ /read priceJ from external variable input 
2 : if [price J < best—price) 
S i 
2.1 : best-price = priceJ 
2.2 : best shop 二 shop-i 
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Obfuscated code segment 
a : n = 10 
b : m = 0 
c : read(przcei) 
/ / read pricei from external variable input 
6 \ m = pricei 
e : if [(jpricei > -10) and [pricei + m < 0)) 
{ 
e.l : n = 10 
e.2 : m 二 0 
else 
e.3 : if {pricei < bestprice) 
{ . . 
e.3.1 : bestprice = pricei 
e.3.2 : bestshop = shopi \ 
J 
} 
Identity mapping table 
Obfuscated program Original program 
identity of pricei identity of priceJ 
identity of bestprice identity of best—price 
identity of bestshop identity of bestshop 
identity of shopi identity of shopJ 
identity of n 
identity of m 
The obfuscating transformation used is the insertion of irrelevant controls. 
The original code and the obfuscated code are functionally identical. For the sake 
of readability, we change the variable names in the obfuscated code which are 
different from that in the original code. An “ identity mapping" table is generated 
to record the identities of state pairs. Since the number of variables in obfuscated 
program is usually more than that in original program，there are records in the 
table which have identities in the obfuscated program only. 
Assume that there is no tampering, after execution we can obtain the follow-
ing trace: 
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execution trace without tampering: 
(We assume the following initial values: priceJ = 0; best—price 二 8; best shop 
="A", shop-i = “B".) 
1 : price J = 10 
2 : , , , 
(Result values: priceJ = 10; best jpr ice = 8; best�hop = "A", shopJ = “ B".) 
By the trace, re-execution is performed in the following sequence: 
(The program loads the following initial values: priceJ = 0; bestjprice = 8; 
best�hop 二 “ A", shop-i = “ B".) 
a : 
b : 




(Result values: priceJ = 10; best jpr ice = 8; best^hop = "A", shopJ = “ B".) 
Checking table 
Identity mapping table 
"Values of identities of obfuscated program Values of identities of original program: 
"Value Identity Identity Value — 
lO identity of pricei Identity of price—i 10 
8 identity of bestprice identity of best—price 8 
"A" identity of bestshop identity of best^hop "A" 
“B" identity of shopi identity of shopJ “ B" 
10 identity of n 
10 identity of m 
In the re-execution process, the obfuscated program fetches the external vari-
able inputs according to the order of external variable inputs in the execution 
trace. The values of results states resulted from executions of the original pro-
gram and that of the obfuscated program (re-execution) are merged with the 
"identity mapping" table. The combined table is called a checking table. It is 
used to check if the values of the result states from the original execution are 
coherent to that from re-execution. In the above case, the values of all identity 
pairs are matched. Therefore the checking result shows that there is no tamper-
ing. 
On the other hand, we assume that the host is malicious this time. The malicious 
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host tampers with the agent's execution by changing the value of best—price into 
100, similar to the example in Section 4.2. We will get the following execution 
trace. 
execution trace with tampering 
(We assume the following initial values: priceJ = 0; best—price = 8; best shop 
二 “ A", shop-i = “ B".) 
1 : priceJ = 10 




(Result values: priceJ, = 10; bestjprice = 10; best shop = “ B", shopJ = 
“B".) 
Since value of best—price is tampered Into 100 during execution, priceJ is less 
than best-price when executing Statement 2. Therefore statements 2.1 and 2.2 
appears in execution trace. The value of bestjprice becomes that of priceJ. 
By the trace, re-execution is performed in the following sequence: 
(The program loads the following initial values: price—i = 0; best—price = 8; 
best^hop 二 “ A", shop-i = “ B".) 
a : 
b : 




(Result values: price—i 二 10; bestjprice 二 8; best^hop = "A", shopJ = “B".) 
Checking table 
Identity mapping table 
Values of identities of obfuscated program Values of identities of original program 
"Value Identity Identity Value — 
^^10 identity of pricei identity of priceJ, 10 
10 identity of hestprice identity of bestjprice 8 
“B" identity of bestshop identity of best^hop "A" 
“B" identity of shopi identity of shop J ，，B，， 
10 identity of n 
10 identity of m 
The checking table shows that two identity pairs have incoherent (different) 
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values. Therefore the checking result concludes that there is tampering to exe-
cutions of the programs. 
In the example, we have shown how to perform tamper-detection using 
execution tracing with obfuscated program used in re-execution. An "identity 
mapping" table is generated during code-obfuscation and compile-time to 
record the corresponding identities of states in the original program and the 
obfuscated program. The table is used to check the values of the result states 
from the original execution with that from re-execution. If the values of all 
identity pairs are matched, we can conclude that there is no tampering to the 
executions; otherwise, there is tampering to the executions. The detection 
mechanism of our tamper-detection protocol deploys this approach. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Execution tracing is used to make a record of the information during an 
execution. The information is called an execution trace.It contains the or-
der of executed statements and the corresponding process parameters. Re-
execution with execution trace can detect if the execution performed has 
been tampered. 
Obfuscation is to generate a piece of obfuscated code from an original 
code. The obfuscated code is functionally identical to the original code but 
more difficult to learn/read. Our protocol deploys code obfuscation tech-
niques to confuse a malicious host. A piece of obfuscated code is used for the 
re-execution process. There are various obfuscating transformations. Our 
protocol requires transformations which have high resilience such that the 
deobfuscator effort requires exponential time. As a result, a malicious host 
needs to take very long time to break the obfuscated code. 
In our tamper-detection protocol, execution tracing and code obfuscation 
are important components of the detection mechanism. In the detection 
mechanism, we use an obfuscted program to perform re-execution while the 
execution trace is resulted from the execution of its original program. To 
achieve this approach, we need to generate an "identity mapping" table to 
map the identities of states of the obfuscated program to that of the original 
program. Based on this table, we can compare and check their result states. 
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Chapter 5 
A Flexible Tamper-Detection 
Protocol by Using Cooperating 
Agents 
5.1 Introduction 
Our aim is to keep detecting if a mobile agent has been tampered by a 
malicious host along the agent's journey. Once a malicious host is detected, 
the home host will be informed that the mobile agent is likely to be tampered. 
Although this cannot prevent tampering, a fast detection can prevent the 
tampered agent from performing damaging functions. 
The detection part of our protocol is carried out by two cooperating 
mobile agents: a coordinator and a detector. The coordinator is an agent 
to coordinate the tamper-detect ion process. It keeps communicating with 
the mobile agent. When the mobile agent completes execution on a host, 
the coordinator will send a detector to the host. The detector detects if the 
mobile agent has been tampered. The detector is an agent which has the 
ability to detect tampering. In our protocol, the execution tracing approach 
(mentioned in Section 3.1) with code obfuscation is used for detection. The 
detector contains the obfuscated MA's code. The detector first loads initial 
states of the obfuscated code from the coordinator. Then it migrates to 
a suspecting host to perform detection. The obfuscated code is executed 
with input stored by MA previously, and generates its result states. The 
detector compares the difference between result states of MA's trace and 
that of obfuscated code's trace. The difference information is encrypted and 
sent back to the coordinator. The coordinator checks if the difference is 
appropriate. If the result shows that the mobile agent has been tampered, 
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the coordinator will inform the home host. 
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Figure 5.1: Basic flow of the protocol. 
Figure 5.1 shows the basic flow of the protocol. The coordinator always 
situates on honest hosts. A host is honest if it has been checked by the 
detector and the result shows that it has not tampered with the mobile 
agent. A host can also be considered honest if it is a trusted host. The 
mobile agent does not need to do extra job for security except sending its 
host position to the coordinator and generating the execution trace. When 
the coordinator finds that the mobile agent has completed execution on a 
host (change of host position), it sends a detector to the host. The detection 
information is sent back to coordinator. The coordinator then takes action 
according to the result. 
5.1.1 Agent model 
In our protocol, a mobile agent (MA) consists of program, data, and state. 
Program represents the executable program to perform tasks on remote hosts. 
Taking the JAVA programming language as an example, the program part 
can be a piece of bytecode. Data represents information brought along by 
ma； for example, addresses of remote hosts to travel. The data part can 
be plain or encrypted. State represents values of variable identities of the 
program. We assume that the program state is serializable. Regarding to 
characteristics of MA in our protocol, MA has the mobility characteristic 
to migrate from one host to another host. MA is autonomous during the 
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performing of tasks. It does not need to communicate with the home host 
until it finishes its tasks. 
5.1.2 Execution model 
We assume that the program state is serializable. When MA is to migrate to 
a remote host, it can serialize its program state first. After migration, MA 
can continue its previous execution by loading its program state. Program 
states can be serialized into storable data. 
We assume that execution of a program statement is deterministic. This 
means that an execution with the same program statement, program state 
and input must generates the same resulting program state. We assume that 
a remote host executes program statements sequentially. 
5.1.3 System model 
In our protocol, there are home host and remote hosts on the network. The 
hosts are totally connected. MA can migrate from one host to any other 
hosts on the network without routing to other hosts first. Foreign hosts can 
join the network anytime. Idle hosts in the network can disconnect from the 
network anytime. 
5.1.4 Failure model 
In our protocol, we only assume processor failure of remote hosts. A remote 
host may crash permanently or temporarily. We assume that the home host 
will not be permanently crashed. 
5.2 The tamp er- detect ion protocol 
Here we present our protocol which keeps checking the execution trace of a 
mobile agent by using cooperating agents (coordinator and detector). 
The terms used in the protocol are defined as follows: 
• the mobile agent (MA): The agent which is sent by a home host to 
perform tasks. It is the target to protect. 
• coordinator: An agent which coordinates the MA and detector. 
• detector: An agent which detects tampering by checking the execution 
trace. 
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• home host: The host which starts the MA. 
• honest host: A host which is determined by the coordinator to have not 
tampered with the MA and the detector. The home host is an honest 
host. Trusted hosts are also considered as honest hosts. 
• statef. The program state of the mobile agent on hosti after execution. 
• inputi： Inputs to the agent executing on hosti. 
• obfuscated code: The code transformed from MA's code by obfuscator. 
• state'f The program state of the obfuscated code on hosti after execu-
tion. 
The protocol requires two assumptions: 
Assumption 1: The hosts allow agents to communicate with other agents 
on different hosts. 
Assumption 2: The hosts allow agents to store data on the hosts 
Assumption 3: An honest host does not attack the MA. 
Assumption 1 is required because the mobile agent has to communicate 
with cooperating agents. Assumption 2 is required because the mobile agent 
has to store the execution trace on hosts. Assumption 3 is to assume that 
there is no collusion between honest hosts and undetermined hosts. However, 
Chapter 8 will describe a method to relax this assumption. 
The protocol is presented below with the assumption that a mobile agent 
travels to hosti before hosti+i. 
For the home host: 
1.1 Generate two sets of public-private keys 
1.2 Assign a set of keys to the mobile agent 
1.3 Assign the other set of keys to the coordinator 
1.4 Give the public key of the mobile agent to the coordinator 
1.5 Give the public key of the coordinator to the mobile agent 
1.6 Compute statei 
1.7 Transfer the mobile agent to the next host 
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1.8 Give statei to the coordinator 
1.9 Generate obfuscated code 
1.10 Coordinator stores the obfuscated code 
1.11 Coordinator records state identity mapping in obfuscated code to states 
in original code 
The home host initializes the encrypt/decrypt element for communication 
between the mobile agent and coordinator. By using two pairs of public-
private keys, they can send/receive messages to/from each other securely. 
The reason to use public-private keys instead of secret keys is that the exe-
cution trace stored by the MA should only be read by detector only. If secret 
keys are used, a malicious host may extract the secret keys from the MA 
to read the execution trace. We will not show the encrypt/decrypt steps of 
communication in later parts of the protocol. The home host then computes 
the initial state of the mobile agent. The state is given to coordinator for 
later detection process. 
H o m e Host 
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Figure 5.2: MA and coordinator in home host. 
Obfuscated code is used in the re-execution process by detector (refer to 
Figure 5.1 round 3). The obfuscated code is generated at the home host 
and stored in the coordinator (Figure 5.2). In traditional execution tracing 
approach like [30] [11], the original code is used for re-execution process. 
However, in our protocol, since the platform to perform the process can be 
a malicious host which may try to attack the re-execution process if it has 
already tampered with the executed MA. If the code for re-execution is the 
original code, the malicious host can easily tamper with the original code 
and the code for re-execution twice in the same way. And the result states 
of re-execution will match that of original execution even though they have 
been tampered. Therefore, to solve the problem in our protocol, obfuscated 
code is used in the re-execution process instead of the original code. If a 
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malicious host has tampered with the states in the original MA and tries to 
tamper with the states again during the re-execution process, the tampered 
result states of the original MA and that of the obfuscated code should be 
different. With different result states, the protocol can detect tampering. 
There are some requirements that the obfuscating transformation must 
satisfy in the protocol. First, since the obfuscated code is to confuse remote 
hosts, obfuscating transformations with high resilience (degree of resisting 
deobfuscating) are preferred. Preventive transforms [6] with high resilience 
are designed to increase the deobfuscation cost. Second, since the obfuscated 
code is used in re-execution, the obfuscated code must be executable. Third, 
the number of variables in the obfuscated code should be more than that in 
the original code. Most obfuscating transformations satisfy the requirement. 
In addition, during compilation, a mapping of "identities of variables in 
executable of original code" and "identities of variables in obfuscated code" 
is needed to be generated and be stored in coordinator. There should be 
some identities without mapping to original variables since code obfuscation 
produces additional variables. Figure 5.3 shows an example of "identity 
mapping" table. 
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Figure 5.3: An example of "identity mapping" table. 
Now we assume that the coordinator is on hosti and the mobile agent is 
on hosti^i, where hosti is an honest host. 
For the mobile agent at hostj^i: 
2.1 Perform task 
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2.2 Trace input 
2.3 Compute statci^i 
2.4 Add inputi^i and statei^i to a message 
2.5 Send statei^i to coordinator 
2.6 Encrypt the message with public key of coordinator 
2.7 Store the message on hosti+i 
2.8 Send message of (address of next host to migrate) to coordinator 
2.9 Migrate to hosti^2 
For the mobile agent at hosti+2: 
3.1 Send message of (arrival to /io减+2) to coordinator 
Steps 2.1 to 2.8 and 3.1 show the protocol for the mobile agent. The 
mobile agent performs its task on hosti+i. At the same time, it traces the 
inputs to its execution on the host. The set of traced inputs is represented 
by inputi+i. After execution with statei and inputi+i, the state of the mobile 
agent becomes statei+i. Figure 5.4 illustrates an execution on hosti+i. 
Host 1+1 
State I ~ • e x e c y t i o n ：—# s ta te i+1 
1 
iopyl i寺 1 
Figure 5.4: An execution on hosti+i. 
The mobile agent computes statci^i, and add inputand statei^i to a 
message (trace), statci^i is sent to coordinator for tamper-detection. The 
mobile agent then encrypts the message and stores it on hosti^i (with As-
sumption 2). Since the message is encrypted with the public key of the 
coordinator, only coordinator and detector (with private key of coordinator) 
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are able to decrypt and read the message. The mobile agent sends a message 
about the next host to migrate to the coordinator before migration. 
The mobile agent finally migrates to hosti^2' Once the mobile agent has 
successfully migrated to hosti+2, it sends a message to the coordinator about 
its arrival to a new residing host address. 
Here is a consideration for host failure. If hosti^i or hosti^2 halts when 
the mobile agent is residing on it, the mobile agent cannot send a message 
to the coordinator. A malicious host may also deny sending a message to 
the coordinator for the mobile agent. To overcome this possible problem, the 
mobile agent can send "heart-beat" messages to the coordinator after every 
fixed period. By receiving the "heart-beat" message, the coordinator can 
know that the mobile agent is still alive. If the coordinator fails to receive 
a "heart-beat" message from the mobile agent for some fixed period, it can 
assume that the mobile agent has been attacked. The host on which the 
mobile agent resided at last is suspected to be a malicious host. 
For coordinator at hostj: 
4.1 Receive message of (arrival at host 1^2) from the mobile agent 
4.2 Generate detector by combining detector code and obfuscated code 
4.3 Load statci to obfuscated code in detector 
4.4 Transfer detector to hosti+i 
The coordinator on hosti waits for the (arrival at /io<s“+2) message from 
the mobile agent. Once the coordinator receives the message, it generates 
a detector by combining detector code and obfuscated code. The detector 
code is the part for controls such as to communicate with coordinator and 
to launch the obfuscated code for re-execution; while the obfuscated code is 
the part for execution checking. Detector loads statei to the obfuscated code 
according to the identity mapping table record in the coordinator. There are 
some identities in the obfuscated code which have no corresponding values 
in statei. It then migrates to hosti+i to check inputand statci^i stored 
by the mobile agent. 
For detector at hosti^i: 
5.1 Decrypt the message stored by the mobile agent 
5.2 Execute the obfuscated code to compute state'^+i using inputi^i 
5.3 Send to coordinator 
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When detector has migrated to hosti^i, it decrypts the message stored 
by the mobile agent using the private key of the coordinator. Through the 
message, the detector gets i n p u t a n d statei+i. Then the detector performs 
the checking process. The detection mechanism is based on the execution 
trace approach [30]. But the obfuscated code is executed instead of the 
original one. This is to prevent a malicious host from tampering a piece 
of code in the same way twice. After the execution, the detector computes 
state'-^i. state'-^^ is sent back to the coordinator for checking. 
Similar to the mobile agent, the detector can send "heart-beat" messages 
to the coordinator every fixed period to show that it is still alive. 
Figure 5.5 shows an overview of the protocol from Step 2 to Step 5. 
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Figure 5.5: An overview of the protocol (Step 2 to Step 5). 
For coordinator at hostj： 
6.1 Receive state'-j^^ from detector 
6.2 Check if is valid with respect to statei+i 
6.3 If result is ok (no tampering is detected), 
- s e n d message to detector to inform it to terminate 
—send message of coordinator's (address of next host to migrate to) 
to the mobile agent 
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—migrate to hosti^i 
6.4 If result is not ok (tampering is detected), 
—send alert message to home host 
The coordinator at hosU waits for state'-j^^ from the detector. It checks 
state'-^-^ and see if the values match the values in statei+i. The coordinator 
compares the values in a pair according to the identity mapping table. Figure 
5.6 shows how the checking table is generated. The values of a pair are 
matched if the value of an identity in statci^i is the same as the value if 
its corresponding identity in state'^+i. If all pairs are matched, the checking 
result is ok (no tampering is detected). The detection mechanism is described 
in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 5.6: An example of generation of checking table. 
If the result is ok, meaning that the host is honest, the coordinator first 
sends a message to the detector to inform it to terminate. It then sends 
a message to the mobile agent at hosti+2 stating the address of the next 
host the coordinator will migrate to. And then the coordinator migrates to 
host i+1. Before migration, coordinator discards state'- but retains state'-^^. 
The mobile agent (MA) starts to follow the protocol from Step 2.1. The new 
coordinator resides on an honest host. 
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If the result is incorrect, meaning that the host is malicious, the coordina-
tor sends an alert message to the home host. The alert message contains the 
address of the malicious host and the address of the host the mobile agent 
is residing at the moment. The home host thus knows about the malicious 
host. It can then take action to handle the tampered mobile agent. For 
example, it may call the mobile agent back home or send a message to the 
host at which the mobile agent is residing to prevent any harmful execution. 
Based on this protocol, if the mobile agent is not tampered along its 
journey, all hosts in the itinerary will be checked and found to be honest. 
5.3 Fault-tolerance policy 
Our protocol uses heart-beating messages to prove the existence of an agent. 
MA sends heart-beating messages to coordinator. Coordinator sends heart-
beating messages to MA. Detector sends heart-beating messages to coordi-
nator. Therefore, coordinator knows the locations of MA and detector while 
m a and detector know the location of coordinator. The length of interval 
of the messages depends on network status. If network traffic is busy, the 
interval should be longer; if network traffic is not busy, the interval can be 
shorter. The length of interval is defined on home host. For example, if coor-
dinator cannot receive heart-beating message from MA beyond the interval, 
coordinator will send request message to MA for response. If there is still 
no response from MA, coordinator will assume that MA has been attacked 
or the remote host is crashed. And coordinator will inform home host about 
this failure. Similarly, MA and detector will inform home host if there is 
failure occured on coordinator] 
If either MA or coordinator or detector is crashed, home host will assume 
that the execution of MA has been tampered. 
5.4 Costs of the protocol 
The costs of the protocol is classified into three categories. The first one is 
the setup cost at the home host. The second one is the session cost in each 
session of the protocol from Steps 2.1 to 6.3 in Section 5.2. The third is 
execution cost of MA compared to execution without deploying the security 
protocol. 
Setup Cost 
• 2 public-private key generation 
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• 1 coordinator generation 
• 1 code obfuscation 
The home host needs to generate two pairs of public-private key for the 
mobile agent and the coordinator. The generation cost is directly related to 
the length of the keys. So it depends on how secure the home host wants the 
mobile agent to be. 
The coordinator consists of three parts of codes: coordinator control code, 
e.g. coordination procedures, state checking procedures; detector code for 
generating detector; and obfuscated MA code as well as the identity mapping 
table. Since the coordinator control code and the detector code are provided 
by programmer in the beginning, the generation cost is constant time. 
The cost of code obfuscation refers to the time to generate obfuscated 
MA code and its identity mapping. The cost depends on the algorithm of 
obfuscator as well as complexity of original code. For example, an obfuscator 
contains transformation to transform looping controls will execute longer if 
the original code consists of many looping controls. Therefore the cost cannot 
be directly related to size of original code. In our protocol, an identity 
mapping table is stored in coordinator. The cost of generating the identity 
mapping table is proportional to the number of variables in the original code. 
The setup cost is only introduced when a mobile agent is generated. 
Therefore it affects little the performance of the protocol. 
Session Cost 
• 1 detector generation 
• 1 migration of detector 
• 1 re-execution 
• 1 state comparison 
• 1 migration of coordinator 
• Transports of messages between the mobile agents, coordinator and 
detector 
The session cost represents the cost to detect tampering in a session. A 
session starts from the MA finishing execution on a host, and ends when 
tamper-detection result is generated. The coordinator needs to generate a 
detector in a session. Since the generation is done by merging detector code 
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and obfuscated MA code, the cost should be low (constant time). The de-
tector migrates to a suspicious host. The migration cost depends on the host 
environment and the size of the detector. However, the migration cost should 
be approximately equal to that of the mobile agent. With the execution trace 
approach, the detector performs re-execution on the host. This can be time-
consuming. But the time taken should be less than the original execution by 
the mobile agent because the detector needs not to wait for inputs this time. 
However, since the code is obfuscated, there is execution overhead to execute 
obfuscated code compared to original code. This depends on the algorithm 
of the obfuscator. There are many obfuscating transformations with various 
execution overheads [6]. The protocol only requires transformation with high 
resilience and addition of variables. Therefore the overhead is controllable by 
suitable selection. The coordinator compares the state from re-execution to 
the state from the original execution. The cost is proportional to the number 
of states. The comparison cost should be low compared with the re-execution 
cost and migration cost. 
The session cost mainly affects the performance (time) of tamper-detection. 
Since MA needs not to wait for detection result, the session cost does not 
affect the MA's performance. 
The bottleneck of session cost is the re-execution cost, we will describe a 
method to reduce the cost by using slicing in Chapter 9. 
MA execution Cost 
• Generation of execution trace 
The MA execution cost represents the overhead in executing the MA. The 
overhead is due to the generation of the execution trace. The trace consists of 
sequence of inputs to MA. Therefore the cost is proportional to the number 
of inputs. 
Besides the above costs, there are costs for transports of communication 
messages between the mobile agents, coordinator and detector. The sizes of 
these messages are very small; most of them only contain addresses of hosts. 
These costs depend on the network status. 
5.5 Discussion 
The proposed protocol offers some advantages over existing agent protection 
approaches. First, the agent protection task of the protocol is mostly done 
by cooperating agents (coordinator and detector). The hosts only need to 
allow mobile agents to store data on them and communicate with agents on 
other hosts. The hosts need not provide additional service or computation 
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to support the protocol. This provides flexibility for agent systems to imple-
ment the proposed security protocol as an add-on to the existing underlying 
protocols. The agent systems basically do not need any modifications. The 
proposed protocol is a flexible and "soft" tamper-detect ion solution to mobile 
agent systems. 
Second, execution overhead to execution of mobile agent is low. In the 
proposed protocol, besides normal execution, a MA only needs to generate 
execution traces and communicate with coordinator. Compared with [11], 
m a in our protocol needs not to wait for tamper-detect ion result before 
performing tasks. The influence on MA performance in our protocol is little. 
Third, the protocol can target the address of a malicious host. Since the 
tamper-detection is performed every time the mobile agent completes execu-
tion, the protocol can target a malicious host immediately if the detection 
result shows that the host has tampered with the mobile agent. 
Fourth, the protocol can detect "denial of execution" attack. In existing 
approaches, "denial of execution" is di伍cult to prevent because the mobile 
agent travels alone. In the proposed protocol, the mobile agent is moni-
tored by a coordinator along its journey. If the mobile agent is trapped by a 
malicious host by "denial of execution", it cannot send a message to the co-
ordinator. Once the coordinator finds that the mobile agent has no response, 
it can assume that the mobile agent has been attacked. The coordinator can 
then inform the home host and the home host can send another mobile agent 
to continue with the unfinished task. 
There are some disadvantages of the protocol. First, the protocol can-
not prevent tampering. Although the protocol can detect tampering when 
the mobile agent is still on its journey, it cannot prevent a malicious host 
from tampering with the mobile agent. It is possible that a tampered agent 
executes on other non-malicious hosts. There is a solution to overcome this 
problem. We can modify the protocol so that when the mobile agent mi-
grates to hosti+i, hosti+i will inform the coordinator to see if host i is honest. 
hostij^i will not execute the mobile agent until it has been told that host i 
is honest. However, this is likely to imply a significant waiting time for the 
answer. Usually hosts have their own security mechanisms to protect them 
from harmful agents. Therefore, this modification may be deployed if hosts 
in the agent system can be easily attacked by agents. 
Second, there are lots of communications between agents in the proto-
col. Although the sizes of the messages are small, they still increase the 
network traffic. Therefore the protocol is more suitable on networks with 
high bandwidth. 
Third, since the protocol deploys execution tracing in its detection mecha-
nism, it inherits some limits of execution tracing. Mobile agents are required 
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to be single threaded. If this is not the case, an extension to the tracing 
mechanism is required [30]. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have presented our tamper-detection protocol for mo-
bile agents. Since the protocol needs no trusted third party and only needs 
little or no modification to agent environments, the protocol is suitable for 
open networks. The basic idea of the protocol is to use cooperating agents 
to continuously monitor the mobile agents and check the executions of the 
mobile agents along their journey. The detection mechanism is derived from 
execution tracing and code obfuscation techniques. Once a malicious host is 
detected, the cooperating agents can inform the home host that the mobile 
agent is likely to have been tampered. 
The proposed protocol is flexible. Since the protocol requires mostly 
participation by cooperating agents (coordinators and detectors), it is easy 
for the protocol to be implemented on existing mobile agent systems. The 
prerequisite is that agent environments on the hosts can provide data storage 
for mobile agents. 
The protocol can preserve the important characteristic of asynchronous 
execution for mobile agents, as the home hosts are not involved in sessions of 
the protocol unless the mobile agents are found to have been tampered. There 
is no waiting time for the mobile agents in the protocol. The protocol can 
also detect "denial of execution" attack from malicious hosts by continuous 
monitoring. 
There are some drawbacks for the protocol. The intensive communication 
in the protocol increases network traffic, meaning that the protocol is more 
suitable to networks with high bandwidth. The protocol inherits the limit 
of execution tracing that mobile agents are required to be single threaded. 
Since cooperating agents (coordinator and detector) are used in the protocol, 
the protocol is more suitable to agent systems in which an agent environment 
can support several mobile agents. 
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Chapter 6 
Verification of the Protocol by 
B A N Logic 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we verify the security of data flow of our tamper-detection 
protocol. The verification uses BAN logic [4] which has been widely used for 
analyzing authentication and cryptographic protocols [1]. BAN logic is used 
to find out security weakness (in cryptography) and unnecessary actions of a 
protocol by looking into prerequisite assumptions. However, a "verification" 
with BAN logic does not necessarily imply that no attacks on the protocol 
are possible [17]. 
To ensure the correctness of the protocol, we need to ensure the following 
three requirements: 
1. Program state of original code after execution on hosti+i, i.e. statei+i, 
sent by MA on hosti^i to coordinator on hosti is secure. 
2. Program state of obfuscated code after re-execution on hosti+i, i.e. 
state'i+” sent by detector on hosti+i to coordinator on hosti is secure. 
3. hosti^i does not know the correct "identity mapping table". 
The protocol requires coordinator to check statci^i and state'-,^^ with the 
use of an "identity mapping table". To perform the checking correctly, the 
two states should be the ones obtained from execution and re-execution on 
hosti^i respectively. This means that the two states need to be secure during 
transmission from hosti to hosti+i. Verification of their security is provided 
in this chapter. (If an unknown third party without correct "identity map-
ping table" modifies the two states during their transmissions, coordinator 
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is able to find out the inconsistence of the two states during checking. The 
coordinator will conclude that tampering is detected.) 
In addition to the security of transmissions of states, we need to ensure 
that hosti+i does not know the correct "identity mapping table". In the 
protocol, it is possible for home host and {hosti, host?,..., hosti} to get the 
” identity mapping table" since coordinator has travelled to them. According 
to the assumption of the protocol, coordinator travels to only honest hosts. 
Since an honest host does not attack MA, it will not send the "identity 
mapping table" to other hosts. However, in real-life applications, there may 
be hosts that pretend to be honest but try to attack MA by getting the 
"identity mapping table" and sending it to a malicious host, e.g. hosti^i. 
We have developed an extension for the protocol to handle this problem in 
Chapter 8. 
6.2 Modifications to B A N logic 
To represent our tamper-detection protocol in BAN logic, we need to make 
several modifications to BAN logic. The reason is that the traditional BAN 
logic cannot handle some of the concepts in the protocol, e.g. code obfusca-
tion. The followings are the necessary modifications: 
1. Assume that p represents a piece of executable program, {p}a repre-
sents corresponding obfuscated program with random seed a. On the 
other hand, assume that d represents a piece of data, {d}k represents 
corresponding encrypted data with key k. 
2. Use 1= to represent ”not know". P |丄 JC means that P may know the 
existence of X but P does not know the content of X. 
The first modification is to represent the code obfuscation concept used in 
the protocol. In the original BAN logic, there is no logic to represents code 
obfuscation. To represent the obfuscation concept, we use the encryption 
logic in BAN logic. For the encryption logic in BAN logic, a key is used 
to encrypt a piece of data. For code obfuscation, a random seed is used for 
transforming a piece of program. Due to the similarity, we use the encryption 
logic to represent the obfuscation concept of the protocol. 
The second modification is an add-on to the original BAN logic. The 
logic is to represent that a principal does not know the content of a piece 
of information. In the description of our protocol, we will use this logic 
to assume that hosti^i does not know the content of the correct "identity 
mapping table". 
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To verify our tamper-detection protocol with BAN logic, we will first 
model the protocol, goals, sub-goals, and assumptions into BAN logic no-
tations. The protocol describes message transmissions; goals describe what 
the protocol is to achieve; assumptions describe necessary conditions for the 
protocol to achieve the goals. Then we will verify the goals of the protocol 
based on the protocol and assumptions. 
6.3 Term definitions 
In this chapter, we will use the following terms for verification. 
A : the mobile agent (MA) to perform tasks 
C : coordinator 
D : detector 
H{i) : hosti 
H{i + 1) : hosti^i 
s{i) : statci 
s{i + 1) : statei+1 
s'{i) : state'-
s'{i + 1 ) : state'-^i 
t[i) : tracci 
t{i + 1) : tracei+i 
p : original program of MA 
{p}a ： obfuscated program of MA 
a : random seed for generating the obfuscated program; it also represents 
content of ” identity mapping table" 
kA : public key of A 
kc ： public key of C 
E : execution process on a host 
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F ： code obfuscation process 
M : identity mapping process 
The terms are coherent to the terms used in our protocol described in 
Chapter 5. 
6.4 Modeling of our tamper-detection proto-
col 
The message transmissions of the tamper-detection protocol can be summa-
rized into the following steps: 
1. MA encrypts tracci^i with public key of coordinator (kc), and stores 
the encrypted message on hosti+i. 
2. MA encrypts statei^i with public key of coordinator (kc), and sends 
the encrypted message to coordinator. 
3. Coordinator sends detector,obfuscated code, private key of coordinator 
(k^^) to hosti+i. 
4. Detector decrypts trace,+1 with k^^. Detector executes {p}a with 
tracei^i. Detector generates 
5. Detector encrypts state'-^^ with public key of coordinator (kc), and 
sends the encrypts message to coordinator. 
It holds that: 
Execution of original program p with statei+i and input trace,+1 
will generate statei^i. 
• F{p,a) = {p}a 
Code obfuscation of program p with random seed a will generate 
obfuscated program {p}a ‘ 
• £;(y(0，{p}cn^+l))=y(‘ + l) 
Execution of obfuscated program {p}a with state\+i and input tracci^i 
will generate state'-^^. 
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If there is no tampering to the program states, there exists 
a corresponding identity in state�for each identity in statei+i 
with same value. The mapping process requires an "identity 
mapping table" which is generated during the code obfuscation 
process. 
In BAN logic notation, the protocol can be presented as: 
h Ha 
Generate key for MA. 
2. He 
Generate key for coordinator. 
3. H(i + 1) : {t{i + l)}kc 
MA encrypts tracei^i on hosti^i. 
4. A - ^ C : {s{i + 
MA encrypts statei^i and sends it to coordinator. 
5. 
Coordinator sends detector with obfuscated code to hosti+i. 
6. D-^C : s\i + 
Detector encrypts state'似 and sends it to coordinator. 
6.5 Goals 
For the protocol to correctly perform tamper-detect ion, the protocol needs 
to achieve the following three goals: 
• Coordinator believes that both coordinator and MA believe statci^i. 
• Coordinator believes that both coordinator and detector believe state'似. 
• Coordinator believes that mapping function can function correctly. 
In BAN logic notation, the goals can be presented as: 
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1. f ^ A 
C believes that C and A both believe statci^i. 
2. C\=C 鹤 ) D 
C believes that C and D both believe state'拟. 
3. C I三 + = s{i^l) 
C believes that the mapping function M is valid. 
6.6 Sub-goals 
The sub-goals are used for reaching the goals during verification. From the 
protocol and goals, we can define the following sub-goals: 
• MA and coordinator both believe that encryption with the key Jca is 
secure. 
• Coordinator and MA both believe that encryption with the key kc is 
secure. 
• Coordinator and detector both believe that encryption with the key kc 
is secure. 
In BAN logic notation, the sub-goals can be presented as: 
1. C 
A and C both believe in 
2. C ^ A 
C and A both believe in kc. 
C ^ D 
C and D both believe in kc. 
6.7 Assumptions 
According to the assumptions of the protocol described in Chapter 5.2, an 
honest host does not collude with other host to attack MA. Specifically, an 
honest host does not send the "identity mapping table" to other host. The 
followings are the assumptions for the protocol: 
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• hosti^i does not know the random seed a. (obfuscation take hosti^i a 
very long time to break.) 
• hosti {{hostI, h o s t h o s t i } are honest) does not send the "identity 
mapping table" to other hosts. Thus hosti does not send the random 
seed a to other hosts. 
In BAN logic notation, the assumptions can be presented as: 
1. E{s{i),p,t{i^l)) = s{ii-1) 
2. E{s\i),{p}^,t{i-\-l)) = s\i^l) 
Detector can successfully execute obfuscated program {p}a and 
send the result state s\i + 1 ) to coordinator. 
3. I - a 
H{i + 1) does not know a . 
4. C \=a 
5. H{i) \=C\=a 
6. H{i + 1) \=C\=a 
Honest hosts {hostl^ host2,hosti} knows the "identity mapping 
table". 
6.8 Verification 
The verification is based on the message transmissions and assumptions de-
scribed in this chapter. The basic idea of the verification is described as 
follow: 
1. kA is public key of MA. 
11. kc is public key of coordinator. 
III. MA and coordinator both believe that encryption with Au is secure 
Sub-goal(l). 
IV. Coordinator and MA both believe that encryption with kc is secure — 
Sub-goal(2). 
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V. Coordinator and detector both believe that encryption with kc is secure 
—^  Sub-goal(3). 
VI. Coordinator and MA both believe that statei^i is secure -> Goal(2). 
VII. Coordinator and detector both believe that state'-^^ is secure Goal(3). 
In BAN logic notation, the verifications can be presented as: 
1. a\=HA 
Public key of A, 
2. C 
C knows existence of Ica . 
3. A \ = C \ = H A 
A tells C about Jca, 
4. C \ = D \ = H A 
C tells D about k^. 
5. C \=HC 
Public key of C . 
6. A丨三C 
A knows existence of kc. 
7. C \ = A \ = H C 
C tells A about kc•. 
8. D I三 C 
D knows existence of kc. 
9. C \ = D \ = t ^ C 
C tells D about kc. 
k A ^ A 
a=4a,a\=c\=4a 
10. % 
A and C both believe in kA — Sub-goal(1). 
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k 广 kr^ 
• k广 
C ^ A ,、 
C and A both believe in k � Sub-goal(2). 
k 广 k/^ 
12. 4 
C ^ D ,、 
C and D both believe in kc -> Sub-goal(3). 
13. A + 
A generates statei+i. 
14. A\={s{i + l)}ka 
A encrypts statci^i with kc, 
15. A \ = C < - { s { i - ^ l ) } k c 
A sends {^(i + to C, 
Since C knows private key k^^， C knows statei+i. 
18. C\=A\=s{i-^l) 
C knows that A knows statei^i. 
19. ？ ( 、 
C and A both believe in statei+i Goal(l). 
20. C \ = D \= 
21. D I三 s\i) 
D knows state'-. 
22. D 丨三{p}a 
D knows {p}a. 
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23. C \ = D \ = kc^ 
24. D I三 k^^ 
D knows private key k?. 
Since D knows private key k^^, D knows t{i + 1). 
After re-execution, D generates state'拟. 
27. D\={s'{i + l)}kc 
D encrypts state,…with kc. 
28. D\=C {s\i + l)}kc 
D sends {s'{i + to C. 
30. 三彻 1) _ 
Since C knows private key C knows staie'w 
31. C\=D\=s'{i^l) 
C knows that D knows state'拟. 
, (、 
C and D both believe in state'-^^ Goal (2). 
33. H{i) I三 a 
34. H{i) I三 H{i + l)\=a 
Honest host does not tell content of "identity mapping table" 
to undetermined hosts. 
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35. C 1= H{i) I三丑(i + 1) | = a 
C believes that honest host does not tell content of "identity 
mapping table" to undetermined hosts. 
36. C \=H{i + l) 1= a 
C believes that H{i-\-1) does not know content of "identity 
mapping table". 
Since C believes that statci^i, state,拟，and a are secure, C 
believes that the mapping function M is valid — Goal(3). 
6.9 Conclusion 
From the verification, we can draw the following three conclusions: 
1. It is secure for MA on hosti^i to send statci^i to coordinator on hosti. 
2. It is secure for detector on hosti^i to send state'-j^^ to coordinator on 
hosti. 
3. Assume that hosU^i does not know the "identity mapping table", co-
ordinator can correctly perform tamper-detection according to statei^i 
and state\+i. 
The results show that the message transmission in the protocol is secure, 
and thus coordinator is able to perform tamper-detection by checking pro-
gram states statci^i and state^,^^. However, a malicious host may try to 
bypass tamper-detection in two ways. The first way is to deobfuscate the 
obfuscated program. If a malicious host can successfully deobfuscate the ob-
fuscated program, it is able to construct the "identity mapping table". As 
described in Section 4.3.1, deobfuscation can be a very time-consuming pro-
cess similar to breaking encryption. Therefore it is not easy for a malicious 
host to bypass tamper-detect ion in this way. The second way is to collude 
with an honest host. Although our protocol assumes that an honest host 
does not collude with undetermined hosts, this assumption may be invalid in 
real applications. Therefore we have developed an extension to handle this 
problem in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 7 
Experimental Results Related 
to the Protocol 
7.1 Introduction 
We have conducted experiments to evaluate the performance of our tamper-
detection protocol. The experiments measure the overheads to the mobile 
agent under different settings. The settings include running without using 
the protocol, running with using protocol. From the experiments, we can 
observe the overheads of deployment of the protocol. 
Java is popular in the development of mobile agent systems. Although it 
is not specifically designed for mobile agents, the inherent support of code 
mobility and platform independence makes Java a good choice to develop 
mobile agent systems [3] [7]. In the experiments, we use the IBM Aglets [14 
15] as the mobile agent platform. It is one of the most popular mobile agent 
platforms. 
7.2 Experiment environment 
We have used two sets of experiment environment. They are "single ma-
chine" environment and "two machines network" environment. The "single 
machine" environment uses a computer to simulate multiple hosts, therefore, 
there is no network traffic. On the other hand, the ”two machines network" 
environment uses two computers to establish a network where mobile agents 
need to migrate from one computer to another computer. By using the two 
different environment settings, we can obtain experimental results with and 
without influence of network traffic and communications factors. The exper-
iment environment is listed in the followings. 
54 
Single machine environment: 
Machine : Intel Pentinum IV L4GHz with 256MB RAM 
Operating System : Microsoft Windows 2000 
Execution Platform : Java 1.1.8 
Agent Platform : IBM Aglets 1.1.0 
Two machines network: 
Two Machines : Intel Pentinum II 450MHz with 128MB RAM 
Operating System : Microsoft Windows 2000 
Execution Platform : Java 1.1.8 
Agent Platform : IBM Aglets 1.1.0 
During the experiments, other programs are closed to minimize their in-
fluence on the experimental results. 
7.3 Experiment procedures 
In each experiment, seven Aglets servers "Tahiti" are setup on the ma-
chine (s). The servers have the same IP addresses but different port numbers 
of 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000, and 7000 respectively. The servers 
with port number 1000 and 7000 are defined as home hosts. A mobile agent 
is generated on home host with port number 1000. The agent will travel from 
home host to server of port number 2000, then to 3000 and so on. Finally 
the mobile agent will migrate to the server of port number 7000 and stop. 
Among the hosts, there are 5 remote hosts (port numbers from 2000 to 6000). 
In each experiment, five different numbers of remote hosts are used. For ex-
ample, one remote host means to use servers of port numbers 1000, 2000 and 
7000; while two remote hosts means to use servers of port numbers 1000, 
2000, 3000, and 7000. The measured times are counted from initialization of 
the mobile agent to its arrival at home host. 
Under the "single machine" environment, the Aglets servers are setup 
on single machine. On the other hand, under the "two machines network" 
environment, servers with port number 1000, 3000, 5000 and 7000 are setup 
on one machine while servers with port number 2000, 4000 and 6000 are 
setup on the other machine. 
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The mobile agent will be executed under two different settings. The 
two settings are "without using the protocol" and "with using the protocol". 
The first setting "without using the protocol" means that the mobile agent is 
executed without deployment of our tamper-detection protocol. The second 
setting "with using the protocol" means that the mobile agent is executed 
with deployment of our protocol. In this way, the overheads (in terms of 
time) of the protocol to the mobile agent can be measured. 
Besides, there are two parameters for each settings. They are "input 
and "cycle". The "input" value represents the number of external variable 
inputs from hosts to agents. It is done by reading a 10-byte string for each 
input. The "cycle" value represents the number of cycles where every cycle 
calculates an integer summation of 1000 values. The usage of the parameters 
are similar to the ones used in [11 . 
In each experiment, five trials are performed and we take the average 
results for plotting the charts. The data can be referred to in Appendix A. 
7A Experiment implementation 
In the experiment, we have programmed two mobile agents. One is a plain 
mobile agent which only reads external inputs from remote hosts and per-
form the summation computations mentioned in Section 7.3. Another is the 
mobile agent which deploys our tamper-detection protocol. The protected 
agent also performs the tasks of the plain agent. The heart-beating mes-
saging is excluded in the experiment since we want to concentrate on the 
execution overhead to the protected agent. The overhead of heart-beating 
also depends on network status very much. In the following we describe the 
structures of the plain agent and the protect agent. Code segments are used 
for explanations. 
Structure of the plain agent 
Step 1. Initialization of itinerary: Use a string array to store the hosts in the 
order of itinerary. Assume that the machines used for the experiments have the 
IP addresses "123.123.123.123" and ”123.123.123.124” respectively. 
In "single machine" environment, the itinerary is defined as: 
S t r i n g [ ] i t i n e r a r y = ( "a tp : / / 123 .123 .123 .123 :1000" , 
" a tp : / / 123 .123 .123 .123 :2000" , " a tp : / / 123 .123 .123 .123 :3000" , 
" a t p : " 1 2 3 . 1 2 3 . 1 2 3 . 1 2 3 : 4 0 0 0 "， " a t p : " 1 2 3 . 1 2 3 . 1 2 3 . 1 2 3 : 5 0 0 0 " , 
"a tp : / / 123 .123 .123 .123 :6000" , " a tp : / / 123 .123 .123 .123 :7000" ) ; 
In "two machines network" environment, the itinerary is defined as: 





int host—order = 0; 
int final-host = 6 ； 
Step 2. Initialization of time: Initialize the starting time. 
private Date initTime， endTime; 
initTime = new Date()； 
Step 3. Looping control: Do Step 4 to Step 7 until the agent reaches the 
host "atp://123.123.123.123:7000". 
while(host_order < finalJiost){...}; 
Step 4. Read "input": Read external variable inputs from the host store in 
file "C:\Aglets\data.txt". Each input is a 10-byte string. INPUT—NUMBER rep-
resents the number of inputs for the experiment. 
int i ； 
String dummy = null； 
File infile = new File("C:\Aglets\data.txt")； 
for (i=0; i<INPUTJJUMBER; i++) 
dummy = (S t r i ng ) (FileliiputStreamCiiif i l e ) . r ead( lO) ) ^  
Step 5. Perform "cycle" computation: Calculate an integer summation of 10000 
values for each cycle. CYCLEJ\}UMBER represents the number of cycles for the 
experiment. 
long i, j, number; 
for (j=0; j<CYCLEJJUMBER; j++){ 
number = 0; 
for (i=l; i<10000; i++) 
{number = number + i；} 
} 
Step 6. Measure time: Measure the time used from starting up to now. 
endTime = new Date()； 
long usedTime = 0 ; 
used Time = endTime.getTime() “ initTime.getTimeO； 
System, out .print In (usedTime).; 
Step 7. Migration to next host. 
ho St-order = host 一 o r d e r + 1; 
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URL next Jiost = new URL(host_order)； 
dispatch (next-host)； 
The plain agent is a simple agent which migrates from a host to another. 
It perform the "input" reading task and summation computation task on 
each host. 
Structure of the protected agent 
Step 1. Initialization of itinerary: Use a string array to store the hosts in the 
order of itinerary. Same as Step 1 of the plain agent. 
In "single machine" environment, the itinerary is defined as: 




In "two machines network" environment, the itinerary is defined as: 




int host .order = 0; 
int finalJiost = 6 ； 
Step 2. Initialization of time: Initialize the starting time. Same as Step 2 of 
the plain agent. 
private Date initTime, endTime; 
initTime = new D a t e O ； 
Step 3. Generate coordinator: Create the coordinator agent from code base. 
The code base is the bytecode generated from source code of the coordinator. 






Step 4. Generate public/private key pairs and the obfuscated code: Generate 
two pairs for public/private keys. One for the protected agent and one for the co-
ordinator. Besides, generate an obfuscated code from the protected agent's code. 
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KeyPairGenerator keyGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA", "SUN")； 
KeyPair pair = keyGen.generateKeyPairO； 
PrivateKey priJkey = pair.getPrivateO ; 
PublicKey pubJkey = pair.getPublic(); 
In the experiments, the code obfuscation is done by pre-defined substitution 
of statements. 
We use "loop blocking" transformation to obfuscate the statements: 
for (i=l; i<10000; i++) 
number = number + i; 
into: 
long k; 
for (k=l; k <=10000; k+=10000) 
for (i=l; i< miii(:L0000，k+9999); i++) 
number = number + i； 
Step 5. Looping control: Do Step 6 to Step 13 until the agent reaches the 
host "atp://123.123.123.123:7000". Similar to Step 3 of the plain agent. 
while (host .order < f inalJiost){. . .}; 
Step 6. Send message to coordinator about current host: Send a message 
with address of current host to the coordinator "experiment. CoorAglet". The 
protected agent only sends the message and does not wait for reply. 






Step 7. Read "input": Read external variable inputs from the host store in 
file "C:\Aglets\data.txt". Each input is a 10-byte string. INPUT—NUMBER rep-
resents the number of inputs for the experiment. Same as Step 4 of the plain 
agent. 
int i ； 
String dummy = null; 
File infile = new FileC'C:\Aglets\data.txt")； 
for (i=0; i<INPUTJJUMBER; i++) 
dummy = (String)(FileInputStream(infile).read(lO)); 
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Step 8. Trace execution: This step works together with previous step (Step 
6). The protected agent only trace the external variable inputs from the host. It is 
done by writing the values of the external variable inputs to file “ C:\Aglets\ trace, txt" 
stoerd in the host. Therefore, by combining Step 7 and 8, the program state-
ments in Step 6 are modified into the following statements. 
int i ； 
String dummy = null； 
File infile = new File("C:\Aglets\data.txt")； 
File outfile = new File("C:\Aglets\trace.txt"); 
for (i=0; i<INPUTJ[UMBER; i++) 
dummy = (String) (FileIiiputStream(iiif ile) .readdO)); 
FileOutputStreairi(outfile) .write(dummy)； 
Step 9. Encrypt the execution trace: Encrypt the trace with the public key 
of coordinator. 
Step 10. Perform "cycle" computation: Calculate an integer summation of 
10000 values for each cycle. CYCLE.NUMBER represents the number of cycles 
for the experiment. Same as Step 5 of the plain agent. 
long i, j, number; 
for (j=0; j〈CYCLE J[UMBER; j++){ 
number = 0; 
for (i=l; i<10000; i++) 
{number = number + i;} 
} 
Step 11. Send message to coordinator about next host to migrate: Send a 
message with address of next host to the coordinator "experiment. CoorAglet". 
The protected agent only sends the message and does not wait for reply. 






Step 12. Measure time: Measure the time used from starting up to now. Same 
as Step 6 of the plain agent. 
endTime = new Date()； 
long usedTime = 0; 
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used Time = endTime .getTimeO - initTime .getTimeO ; 
System.out .println(iisedTinie)； 
Step 13. Migration to next host. Same as Step 7 of the plain agent. 
host一order = host一order + 1; 
URL next Jiost = new URL (host 一 o r d e r ) ; 
dispatch (next Jiost)； 
The protected agent can be considered as a plain agent with using our 
tamper-detection protocol. The additional parts of the protected agent in-
clude generation of coordinator, generation of public-private key pairs, code 
obfuscation, and communications with the coordinator. Please note that the 
obfuscating transformation used in the experiments are constant-time com-
plexity. But in real case, the complexity of an obfuscating transformation 
usually depends on number of control statements in the code. 
7.5 Experimental results 
By assigning parameter "input" to either 1 or 100 and assigning parameter 
"cycle" to either 1 or 10000, we have generated the experimental results 
shown in Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 under "single machine environment" 
setting. 
Figure 7.1 shows the results under the configuration that there is almost 
no input and computation for the mobile agent. In Figure 7.2, there are some 
inputs for the mobile agent but almost no computation. In Figure 7.3, there 
are heavy computations for the mobile agent but almost no input. In Figure 
7.4，there are both heavy computations and some inputs for the mobile agent. 
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Mesured time (in ms) for mobile agent with and without using the protocol. Parameters: 1 input, 1 c7cle . 
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Figure 7.1: Measured time for mobile agent with and without using the 
protocol. Parameters: 1 input, 1 cycle. Single machine environment. 
Measured time (ms) for mobile agent with and without using the protocol. Parameters: 100 inputs, 1 cycle. 
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Figure 7.2: Measured time for mobile agent with and without using the 
protocol. Parameters: 100 inputs, 1 cycle. Single machine environment. 
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Measured time (ms) for mobile agent with and without using the protocol. Parameters: 1 input, 10000 cycles. 
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Figure 7.3: Measured time for mobile agent with and without using the 
protocol. Parameters: 1 inpu t , 10000 cycles. Single machine environment. 
Measured time (ms) for mobile agent with and without using the protocol. Parameters: 100 inputs, 10000 cycles. 
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Figure 7.4: Measured time for mobile agent with and without using the proto-
col. Parameters: 100 inputs, 10000 cycles. Single machine environment. 
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么From Figure 7.1 to 7.4, we observe that there is a significant one-time 
overhead to deploy our protocol. The offsets between graphs of "using" and 
"without using" the protocol imply this initialization overhead. The cost is 
mainly contributed by generation of coordinator in the beginning at home 
host. Since it is only consumed once in the itinerary of the mobile agent, it 
does not affect the agent's performance much if the agent's itinerary is not 
too short. 
On the other hand, we observe that the runtime overhead for the mobile 
agent to deploy our protocol is very little. We can see that the slopes of 
the two graphs in each figure are close. This is especially obvious in Figures 
7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. The slopes measure the average amount of time used on 
each remote host. The time includes migration and execution time. Since 
the slopes are the graphs of "using the protocol" and that of "without using 
the protocol" are close, we can deduce that the runtime overheads of the 
protocol to the mobile agent are very smaller. 
Parameters~ Without the protocol With the protocol Ratio 
1 input,1 cycle ^ 220.35 7.98 
100 inputs,! cycle 30.05 39 1.30 
1 input,10000 cycles 414.65 411.15 0.99 
100 inputs,10000 cycles 417.1 433.1 1.04 
Table 7.1: Average time used for the mobile agent to execute on an additional 
remote host. Single machine environment experiment. 
Table 7.1 shows the average time used for the mobile agent if an additional 
remote host is added in its itinerary. The time is calculated by dividing the 
increase in time measured from supporting one remote host to four remote 
hosts by four. Taking Figure 7.2 as example, the average time for "using 
the protocol" equals to (218.4 — 98.2)/4 = 30.05. The ratio field equals 
to the average time for "using the protocol" over that for "without using 
the protocol".丄From the table, we can investigate how external inputs and 
computations affect runtime overheads. 
In the table, the second to fourth entries (rows) provide more reasonable 
results than the first entry. From the results of the second entry (100 in-
puts,! cycle) and the third entry (1 input,10000 cycles), we can see that the 
100 inputs affect our protocol to generate an 30 percent runtime overhead. 
On the other hand, our protocol is not quite affected by the 10000 cycles. 
This shows that the overhead to pure computation is negligible. In addi-
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tion, by comparing the results of the third entry (1 input,10000 cycles) and 
the fourth entry (100 inputs,10000 cycles), we can see that the 100 inputs 
do affect the protocol. This is because our protocol needs to trace external 
variable inputs for tamper-detection. The action to write information to the 
trace contributes to the overhead. 
Figure 7.1 to 7.4 shows the experimental results under ”two machines 
network" environment. The results also show that the number of inputs 
affect the performance of the mobile agent with using the protocol in larger 
extent than the number of execution cycles. In addition, the communication 
overheads of the protocol are more significant in the ” two machines network" 
environment. As a result, from Table 7.2, the overall performance overheads 
of the protocol are higher under the environment setting. 
Parameters Without the protocol With the protocol Ratio 
1 input,1 cycle 133.75 3.15 
100 inputs,1 cycle 55.05 486.35 8.83 
1 input,10000 cycles 1166.2 1884.2 1.62 
100 inputs,10000 cycles 1295.45 2067.9 1.60 
Table 7.2: Average time used for the mobile agent to execute on an additional 
remote host. Two machines network environment experiment. 
7.6 Conclusion 
We have conducted experiments to evaluate the performance of our protocol. 
From the experimental results, we can see that the runtime overheads for 
deploying the protocol are small. Execution tracing of external inputs to 
the mobile agent contributes most to the runtime overhead. Therefore the 
influence of external variable input to mobile agent using our protocol is 
greater than that of computation size. 
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Figure 7.5: Measured time for mobile agent with and without using the 
protocol. Parameters: 1 input, 1 cycle. Two machines network. 
Measured time (ms) formotik a^nt with aiid without using the protocol. Parameters: 100 inpnts, 1 cycle. Two 
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Figure 7.6: Measured time for mobile agent with and without using the 
protocol. Parameters: 100 inputs, 1 cycle. Two machines network. 
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Measured time (ms) for motile agent with and without using the protocol. Parameters: 1 input, 10000 cycles. Two 
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Figure 7.7: Measured time for mobile agent with and without using the 
protocol. Parameters: 1 input, 10000 cycles. Two machines network. 
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Figure 7.8: Measured time for mobile agent with and without using the 
protocol. Parameters: 100 inputs, 10000 cycles. Two machines network. 
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Chapter 8 
Extension to Solve the ” Fake 
Honest Host” Problem 
8.1 Introduction 
Send "identity mapping table'f 
^ St ate通+1 
+ 
Fake honest host malicious host jdentity mapping 
hosti-1 host j” ^ 
honest host ^ ^ ^ 
hOStj Bypass tamper-detection 
by state’i+i 
Figure 8.1: An example of "fake honest host" problem. 
The protocol assumes that an honest host does not collude with undeter-
mined host(s). In real-life applications, it is not easy to verify this assump-
tion. Some hosts may pretend to be honest at the beginning, i.e. do not 
attack MA during MA's execution; but later collude with malicious hosts to 
attack the MA. We call this problem the "fake honest host" problem. Figure 
8.1 shows an example of the problem. One way to attack MA is to spy on 
the content of the "identity mapping table" and send it to malicious host(s). 
If a malicious host gets the "identity mapping table", it knows the mapping 
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between identities of MA's original code to that of obfuscated code. Accord-
ing to the mapping, the malicious host (assuming it is hosti^i) can generate 
a valid state'—! from statei^i. 
In this chapter, we introduce an extension to the original tamper-detection 
protocol to solve the problem. Assuming that in the current moment, MA is 
executing on hosti^i and coordinator is ready on hosti. {hosti, hostq,…，hosti} 
are honest hosts while hosti+i is undetermined. Assume that hosti+i is mali-
cious and wants to bypass the tamper-detection by colluding with an honest 
host, the extension enables the tamper-detection protocol to detect collusion 
between hosti+i and {hosti, host2,hosti-i}. This can greatly relax the 
assumption that honest hosts and undetermined host do not collude. How-
ever, the extension needs the intervention of the home host and it still cannot 
handle the collusion between hosti^i and hosti. 
8.2 The method to solve the “fake honest 
host ’，problem 
8.2.1 Basic idea 
The basic idea of the solution is to modify the ”identity mapping table" when 
coordinator is migrated to an honest host. Home host randomly generates 
the information of modification and sends it to coordinator. As a result, 
the mapping tables of the honest hosts are different. If a malicious hosti^i 
colludes with {hosti, host】，…，hosti—i] to get an "identity mapping table", 
the table is not the same with the table for coordinator on hosti. Therefore 
coordinator on hosti can detect tampering if hosti^i tries to use the table to 
generate sta~te\+i. 
8.2.2 Description of the method 
First, on home host, we need to insert variable trackjvar to the obfuscated 
program so that trackjvar points to a variable in the state of the original 
MA program. For example: 
int track_var ； 
track一var = (int) (best—price)； 
Correspondingly, there is a field maptrack in "identity mapping table" rep-
resenting the mapping between identity of trackjvar and identity of bestjprice. 
The modified obfuscated program and "identity mapping table" are stored 
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in coordinator in the same way as in the original protocol. Figure 8.2 shows 
the initialization of track variable on home host. 
Identity mapping table 
Obfuscated code obfuscated original “ 
I 1 I 
I ： 
int track_var 
track_var = (int)(best_price) identity of identity of 
trackvar best_piice 
Figure 8.2: Initialization of track variable on home host. 
Afterwards, assume that coordinator finishes checking states and state'^ 
on host) and result is okay, coordinator migrates to hosts. After migration, 
coordinator sends request of trackjvar information to home host. Home 
host will randomly select a variable in the state of the original MA program 
given that the variable has not been selected for mapping with trackJvar 
before. Home host then encrypts the variable information and sends it to co-
ordinator. After receiving the variable information, coordinator modifies the 
obfuscated code so that trackjvar points to the newly selected variable. Ac-
cordingly, coordinator updates the field maptrack in "identity mapping table". 
When MA on hostfinishes execution, coordinator on host】 generates detec-
tor using the modified, obfuscated code. Since obfuscated code is modified, 
the detector generated on hosts is different to that on hosts. The detector 
and coordinator then perform tamper-detection as described in the original 
protocol in Chapter 5. Figure 8.3 shows the steps of the extension to handle 
the "fake honest host" problem. 
Assuming that host4 is malicious and colludes with hostq, host) is a "fake 
honest host". The "fake honest host" host] records the "identity mapping 
table" tahle2 and sends it to malicious host host4. host4 tries to bypass 
tamper-detection by generating state\ from state^ and table】. However, a 
correct state'^ can only be generated from state^ and tables. As a result, when 
coordinator checks the incorrect state'^ with tables, coordinator can find that 
host4 is likely to collude with an honest host since only the mapping pair 
maptrack is not coherent. Figure 8.4 shows that the collusion between host^ 
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4. Update obfuscated 
program and identity 
mapping table 
coordinator ^ Generate detector and 
Othe detector migrates tohosl^ 
host� 
\ \ 3. Send the information 
\ \ of the identity to 
1. Request of \ \ coordinator 
track 一 var \ \ 
information \ 
Lj . , 2. Randomly select an 
Home nosi identity in original 
program (given that 
the identity has not 
been selected) 
Figure 8.3: Steps of method to handle "fake honest host" problem. 
and host] can be detected. 
coordinator 
honest host 广 \ malicious host 
hosts hostt 
2. Incorrect state'4\ 
IS detected \ 咖㊀斗 
\ + 
\ Identity mapp ing from host? 
1. try to bypass 
tamper-detection\ incorrect state'4 
Figure 8.4: Detection of collusion. 
8.3 Conclusion 
In our tamper-detect ion protocol, we assume that honest hosts do not col-
lude with malicious host. In this chapter, we described an extension to the 
protocol to relax the assumption. The method is to modify the "identity 
71 
mapping table" of coordinator on each honest host. Since the modification 
information is randomly generated by home host, a host cannot deduce the 
exact "identity mapping table" of coordinator on other host. The mapping 
tables are different on the honest hosts. Using the method, even if a ma-
licious host hosti+i colludes with "fake honest host" {hosti-i^hosti-2, 
coordinator on hosti can still correctly detect tampering. 
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Chapter 9 
Performance Improvement by 
Program Slicing 
9-1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present an extension to our protocol to shorten the de-
tection time by trading off security level. It may be odd to lower security 
level, but there can be situation where MA has pre-defined trustworthy level 
to remote hosts. For example, assume that MA and a remote host are owned 
by the same owner, the MA may conclude that a lower security level is ac-
ceptable if detection time can be shortened. A shorter detection time implies 
that the remote host can save the time to do other jobs. We deploy program 
slicing techniques to achieve this task. 
9.2 Deployment of program slicing 
A program slice consists of the parts of a program that (potentially) affect the 
values computed at some point of interest, referred to as a slicing criterion. 
The parts of a program which have a direct or indirect effect on the values 
computed at a slicing criterion C are called the program slice with respect to 
criterion C. The task of computing program slices is called program slicing. 
Static slicing only uses statically available information (e.g. data flow and 
control flow dependences) for computing slices [28]. 
In our protocol, the time taken by the detection process in our protocol 
is approximately equal to that of MA's execution. This is because the code 
needs to be executed completely to generate result program states. The 
protocol can use program slicing techniques to shorten the runtime overhead 
of detection. The idea is to generate two slices, where variables of one slice are 
73 
more important (or likely to be attacked) and that of the second slice are less 
important. Regarding to the tamper-detection mechanism of the protocol, a 
complete detection needs to execute the whole piece of code to generate the 
result states for checking. By slicing the code into two, MA's owner can select 
incomplete detection to trade for performance. An incomplete detection 
will only execute the more important slice and check its result states, while 
a complete detection needs to execute the less important slice too. The 
incomplete detection provides security level in between full detection and 
no detection. The decision of performing incomplete or complete detection 
is made by MA's owner. The security level can depend on remote host's 
reputation. For example, MA may need lower security level on a familiar 
host. 
sHcmgJ slke 1 I 疏 — H O b f a c ^ d 
I I slice 1 
MA，s: 
Origmal c o d e | \ 
X j 們 ^ 1 obtocationj Obfecated 
slicing 膽 " I I slice 2 
Figure 9.1: From original code to obfuscated slices. 
The protocol needs several modifications to deploy program slicing men-
tioned above. First two slices can be generated from the original code as 
shown in Figure 9.1. Program slicing is deployed before code obfuscation. 
The slicing criterion can be defined by MA's owner by determining a word 
or a set of words occurring in variables that are important (or likely to be 
attacked). A slicing program will generate the first slice which is related to 
the important variables as well as some variables randomly selected. The 
reason to randomly select variables is to prevent remote hosts to learn the 
composition of variables in a slice directly. The second slice will be related 
to the rest of the variables. The slices are obfuscated separately. 
There will be two coordinators to handle the two slices. Each coordi-
nator records the identity mapping of its respective obfuscated slice. Co-
ordinator(l) with the more important obfuscated slice works similar to the 
coordinator in our protocol without slicing. It will generate a detector to 
detect tampering after the MA finishes execution on a host. Figure 9.2 
shows the communications between MA and the two coordinators. Coordi-
nator (1) needs to communicate with coordinator(2). When coordinator(l) 
finishes checking, if full tamper-detection is required, it orders coordinator(2) 
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Figure 9.2: Communications between MA and coordinators with slices. 
to start the detection process. And coordinator(2) will generate its detector. 
Coordinator(2) sends its checking result to coordinator(l). If no tampering 
is detected, coordinator(l) and coordinator(2) will migrate to the next host. 
9.3 Conclusion 
We have developed an extension to our protocol to increase detection ef-
ficiency by trading off security strength. This can be suitable in situations 
where MA has pre-defined trustworthy knowledge of remote hosts. The tech-
nique used is program slicing. Two or more of obfuscated slices are generated 
instead of a single obfuscated program. The slices are ordered by their im-
portance (or likeliness of being attacked). The obfuscated slices perform 
tamper-detection one by one according to security level required. A full de-
tection is to use all the obfuscated slices to perform detection. If a lower 
security level is selected for a remote host, fewer slices perform detection. 
Thus this can shorten detection time. 
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Chapter 10 
Increase Scalability by 
Supporting Multiple Mobile 
Agents 
10.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present an extension to our protocol to increase scalability. 
There can be situations where a user sends several identical MAs to speed 
up performance. For example, a user may send five information seeking 
MAS to five separate sets of remote hosts instead of sending a single MA. 
In our tamper-detection protocol, a MA is monitored by a coordinator. In 
the example, five coordinators are needed although the code of the MAs 
are identical. To increase scalability of our protocol, we have developed an 
extension for a coordinator to support multiple MAs. 
10.2 Supporting multiple mobile agents 
The overhead of the protocol can be reduced by enabling a coordinator to 
support multiple agents. For example, a user wants to send three MAs with 
identical code to perform tasks on different hosts as in Figure 10.1. Instead 
of using three coordinators to monitor the three MAs, we can modify the 
protocol to enable the coordinator to support the three MAs. The obfus-
cated codes of the three MAs are all stored in the coordinator. Clearly the 
MAs should be owned by the same user or from the same home host. The 
coordinator can be situated on one of the honest hosts. Since the coordinator 
needs to use much memory resources to store MA codes and states, it should 
move to the honest host where memory resource is more available. The host 
76 
^(mT^^ 
/ H o $ t a ( l ) i H o s t a ⑩ H o s t 3 0 + 1 ) 
z C ^ i P ~~~“ """" 
H(mieHostK^ Hostb(i) Hostba) HostlM l^) 
— ^ … … … … … … … — 
H o s t c C l ) “ ― — — H o s t c ( i ) H o s t c a + l ) 
Figure 10.1: An example of itinerary of three mobile agents with identical 
code. 
resource information can be provided by MAs (MA{a,6, c} in Figure 10.1). 
The protocol can be extended so that a coordinator can support multiple 
mobile agents. The prerequisite is that the codes of the multiple mobile 
agents must be the same. Assuming a coordinator is to support n MAs, it 
needs to store the states of all n MAs. It also needs to store a checking queue 
of hosts which has executed the agents. Compared with using n coordinators, 
this can save {n — 1) copies of the obfuscated code. However, if the idle time 
for the MAs is very short, it is not practical for a coordinator to support 
too many agents. This is because the coordinator needs time to generate 
detectors, communicate with detectors and check detection results. The ratio 
of coordinator to agent should be determined by the efficiency of tamper-
detection process as well as how long a MA is idle on each host. 
By comparing the method of "supporting multiple MA" to that of "sup-
porting single MA，，，we can see the following advantages and disadvantages. 
Advantages: 
• Only utilize one host to execute coordinator every session in-
stead of multiple: This is the major advantage of supporting multiple 
MA. Since the number of host utilized every session is reduced, host 
resources can be saved for other purposes. Moreover, if remote hosts 
have limit to number of residing agents, this method can save number 
of agents (coordinators) on the network. However, the host which co-
ordinator resides needs to provide more resource since the information 
handled by the coordinator is increased. 
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• Smaller overall migration overhead: Since the number of coordi-
nators is reduced to one, the number of migration process is reduced. 
And thus the overhead for migration is reduced compared with migra-
tion of multiple coordinators. 
• Centralized control: The coordinator controlling all MAs can get 
statistics of MA status. It is possible for the coordinator to allocate 
tasks to the MAs if some MAs are attacked. 
Disadvantages: 
• Bottleneck: As mentioned in beginning of this section, the tamper-
detection process is time-consuming. Therefore, if the MAs perform 
tasks very quickly, the coordinator needs to queue the host to detect 
into a list. 
• Single point of failure: If the coordinator is lost or failed suddenly, 
all MAs will be vulnerable to tampering attack. If there are multiple 
coordinators, the risk can be distributed. 
• More complex control: The control structure of this method is much 
more complex. This means more resource is needed for constructing 
the coordinator. 
The major advantage of this extension is to save computation resources 
on remote hosts. Only one remote host is needed for handling the tamper-
detection processes instead of multiple hosts. As a result, scalability of the 
protocol can be increased. The major disadvantage is that the remote host 
(supporting coordinator) becomes bottleneck and single point of failure of 
our tamper. 
10.3 Conclusion 
The extension presented in this chapter can increase scalability of the pro-
tocol. However, the extension can only work if the multiple MAs to be 
supported are identical in terms of code. Therefore the extension cannot be 
deployed in general cases. 
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Chapter 11 
Deployment of Trust 
Relationship in the Protocol 
11.1 Introduction 
In our original protocol, we do not consider any trusted third party or trust 
relationship among hosts. The reason is that we want the protocol to suit 
open networks where trust relationships are not necessary. However, if the 
protocol is deployed in a network where some hosts trust others, we can speed 
up the protocol by deploying with the trust relationships. 
11.2 Deployment of trust relationship 
Authentication 
^ ^ ^ ^ Server 
Coorditialor on i+i 
Hosti 
Figure 11.1: An simple authentication framework. 
If a host is trusted by MA's owner (i.e. home host), we can assume 
that the host will not tamper with the execution of MA. Therefore, the 
protocol can skip the tamper-detection process on the host There must be 
an authentication framework in order to establish trust relationship. Figure 
11.1 shows a simple authentication framework. If a host is trusted by the 
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MA, the coordinator needs not to check the MA's execution on the host. 
And the trusted host is treated as an honest host. 
MA on 
HesI 1+2 p — — — I r — — — — — 
Coordinator on 1 Autiienticallon ^ _ H o s t i + 1 
Host i 「 ， Server 
Hosi 1+1 
Is untrust^ 
Coordinator on _ 9 丽 抽 Hosti+t 
議 V ^ 
Host m 
Is trusted — 
Ho 創 
Figure 11.2: The cases for hosU+i is untrusted and trusted. 
In the protocol, the trust relationship can be deployed as in Figure 11.2. 
Assume MA has been executed on hosti^i and coordinator is situated on 
hosti. After the protocol completes Step 3.1 (refer to Section 5.2), coordina-
tor authenticates hosU^i. If hosU^i is not trusted, the protocol works in the 
normal way. Otherwise, if hosU^i is trusted, coordinator only needs to gen-
erate state'i+i and migrates to hosti+i. The followings show modified Step 4 
to Step 6 (refer to Section 5.2) of the protocol for deploying trust relationship. 
For coordinator at hosti: 
4.1 Receive message of (arrival at hosti+2) from the mobile agent 
4.2 Authenticate hosti^i 
4.3 If hosti^i is trusted by MA 
—generate state'-j^^ from siaiei+i and "identity mapping table" 
- s e n d message of coordinator's (address of next host to migrate to) 
to the mobile agent 
—migrate to hosti+i 
- e n d of this session (goto Step 2 in next session) 
4.4 If hosti+i is not trusted by MA 
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- g e n e r a t e detector by combining detector code and obfuscated code 
- l o a d statci to obfuscated code in detector 
—transfer detector to hosti+i 
—goto Step 5 
For detector at hosti^i : 
5.1 Decrypt the message stored by the mobile agent 
5.2 Execute the obfuscated code to compute state^^^ using inpuU^i 
5.3 Send to coordinator 
For coordinator at hosti: 
6.1 Receive state'-^^ from detector 
6.2 Check if state'-^^ is valid with respect to statci^i 
6.3 If result is ok (no tampering is detected), 
- s e n d message to detector to inform it to terminate 
- s e n d message of coordinator's (address of next host to migrate to) 
to the mobile agent 
—migrate to hosti+i 
6.4 If result is not ok (tampering is detected), 
—send alert message to home host 
To deploy trust relationship, only Step 4 of our tamper-detection pro-
tocol needs modifications. In modified Step 4, coordinator checks the trust 
relationship between MA and hosti+i first. If hosti^i is trusted, coordinator 
can skip tamper-detect ion process. 
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11.3 Conclusion 
Our tamper-detection protocol does not require trust relationship between 
MA and remote hosts to protect MA. However, if MA has already established 
trust relationships with some remote hosts, our protocol can be extended to 
deploy trust relationships. Only minor modification to the protocol is needed. 
The modification requires coordinator to authenticate undetermined remote 
host before generating detector. In this way, tamper-detection to a remote 
host can be skipped if the host is trusted by MA. The average detection time 
can be speeded up. 
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Chapter 12 
Conclusions and Future Work 
Mobile agent system is an emerging paradigm in distributed systems. Mobile 
agent system provides three major advantages: reduced network bandwidth, 
customization, and asynchronous task execution. These advantages enable 
mobile agent systems to be particularly suitable on networks with high la-
tency. Although the autonomy and mobility characteristics of mobile agent 
are attractive to applications on open networks, there are several technical 
problems to the paradigm. The problems include strong migration, fault 
tolerance, and security [18] [23]. To deploy mobile agent systems for elec-
tronic commerce applications, we have to ensure security of the systems. In 
particular, agent security is a new issue to traditional distributed systems. 
A malicious host may tamper with the mobile agent to benefit itself. To 
protect a mobile agent, we need to ensure its data integrity, program/code 
integrity, and execution/state integrity. The work described in this thesis is 
to detect execution tampering to mobile agents. 
We have developed a tamper-detection protocol for mobile agents to en-
sure their execution and state integrity. Our protocol deploys three tech-
niques: execution tracing, code obfuscation, and agent cooperation. The 
two kinds of cooperating agents used in the protocol are coordinator and 
detector. Coordinator is used to monitor the mobile agent and coordinate 
detection processes. Detector is used to perform re-execution process of ex-
ecution tracing. The detection mechanism combines execution tracing and 
code obfuscation. By code obfuscation technique, the protocol can let detec-
tor to perform re-execution on undetermined hosts while coordinator always 
locates on honest hosts. Since honest hosts are assumed to be harmless to 
the mobile agent, coordinator can detect tampering in safe environment. Si-
multaneously, the mobile agent is involved in the detection processes, and it 
can perform its tasks in normal way. 
Compared with existing tamper-detection protocols, our protocol has 
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several advantages. In Giovanni Vigna's execution tracing approach [30], 
tamper-detection is performed when the mobile agent goes back to home 
host. If the itinerary of the agent is long and the agent is tampered, the 
agent may have performed a number of harmful actions before going back 
to home host. In our protocol, detection is performed after the mobile agent 
finishes its execution on a remote host. This can provide faster prevention of 
any harmful actions of the mobile agent if it is tampered. On the other hand, 
Fritz Hohl's tamper-detection approach [11] is also based on execution trac-
ing. It can prevent a tampered mobile agent to do harmful actions. However, 
since detection is performed before the agent's execution, the performance of 
the mobile agent is much affected. In our protocol, the mobile agent needs 
not to wait for the detection result, therefore its performance is not affected 
much. Moreover, the detection processes in our protocol is determined by co-
operating agents. The remote hosts need not to install the detection services. 
Our tamper-detection protocol is more flexible to be implemented compared 
to Hohl's protocol, especially in old systems. 
We have conducted experiments for our protocol. The experimental re-
sults show that the overheads of the protocol are acceptable. We have also 
verified the protocol with formal logic. And the result shows that message 
transmissions in the protocol are secure. 
Several extensions have been developed to enhance our protocol. The first 
one is to solve the "fake honest host" problem of the protocol. The problem 
concerns about collusion of honest host and malicious host. Through the 
extension, the problem can be solved to a great extent with intervention of 
home host. The second one deploys program slicing technique to speed up 
the overall detection time by trading off security level. The third one enables 
the protocol to use a single coordinator to support several identical mobile 
agents. The fourth extension enables the protocol to deploy trust relation-
ships to speed up overall detection time. Since the extensions can only be 
used in special cases, they are not considered as basic specification of our 
tamper-detection protocol. 
Regarding to future work, there is still a long way to ensure security of 
mobile agents. First of all, work is needed to integrate the security protocols 
for different aspects, e.g., integrity of data, code/program, state/execution of 
mobile agents. An all-round security protocol is more preferable. Secondly, 
work is needed to integrate security protocol with fault tolerance protocol, 
agent locating protocol, etc. The integration of the protocols should be based 
on the same agent model, execution model, system model, and failure model. 
The Mobile Agent Facility Specification (MAFS) from Object Management 
Group (OMG) [22] provides a good starting point. Thirdly, since the existing 
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execution tracing technique can only support single-threaded program exe-
cution, further research is necessary to develop execution tracing technique 
which can support multi-threaded execution. 
Besides, regarding to our tamper-detect ion protocol, it is possible to mod-
ify the protocol to suit various operating systems. In our research, we assume 
that a remote host can execute a mobile agent at a time. This is the safest 
assumption and is valid for all operating systems. However, there are op-
erating systems which support parallel program execution (provided that 
the machine also support multi-processing). Professor Leung Ho-Fung has 
suggested that it may be possible to execute the original program and obfus-
cated program of the mobile agent concurrently. This is likely to reduce the 
delay between the end of execution and tamper-detection. To develop this 
extension, we firstly need to consider the execution sequences of the original 
program and the obfuscated program. Since the execution of the obfuscated 
program requires the execution trace of the original program, there are exe-
cution dependencies between program statements of the two programs. As a 
result, the two programs cannot be executed in parallel as separate indepen-
dent programs. And the operating system may need modification to support 
this kind of dependent parallel execution, or the obfuscated program needs 
to combine with the original program to form a multi-threaded program. 
However, combining the obfuscated program with the original program can 
affect the performance of the original program. This is undesirable. There-




Data of Experimental Results 
Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
Trial 1 I 80 I 110 I 140 160 180 
Trial 2 70 110 140 181 201 
Trial 3 70 90 120 140 180 
Trial 4 70 90 110 130 160 
Trial 5 60 91 131 151 181 
average 70 98.2 128.2 152.4 18QJ" 
Table A.l: Single machine environment. Mesured time (in ms) for "without 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 1 input, 1 cycle. 
Number of remote hosts 
~ | l | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 " 
Trial 1 I 100 I 130 160 190 220 
Trial 2 91 131 161 201 221 
Trial 3 100 130 160 190 210 
Trial 4 100 130 170 190 230 
Trial 5 100 120 151 191 211 
"average 98.2 128.2 160.4 192.4 218.4 
Table A.2: Single machine environment. Mesured time (in ms) for ”without 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 100 inputs, 1 cycle. 
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Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
Trial 1 1622 2033 2464 2904 3305 
Trial 2 1622 2033 2444 2864 3275 
Trial 3 1632 2053 2453 2864 3275 
Trial 4 1633 2053 2454 2865 3295 
Trial 5 1633 2043 2464 2865 3285 
"li^rage 1628.4 2043 2455.8 2872.4 
Table A.3: Single machine environment. Mesured time (in ms) for "without 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 1 input, 10000 cycles. 
Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
Trial 1 1653 2073 2484 2894 3325 
Trial 2 1672 2083 2503 2924 3345 
Trial 3 1682 2093 2504 2924 3335 
Trial 4 1662 2083 2513 2934 3344 
Trial 5 1652 2063 2483 2894 3344 
Tverage 1664.2 2079 2497.4 2914 3332.6 
Table A.4: Single machine environment. Mesured time (in ms) for "without 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 100 inputs, 10000 cycles. 
Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 
Trial 1 I 571 I 1001 1422 1442 1462 
Trial 2 591 1022 1432 1452 1462 
Trial 3 581 1022 1432 1442 1462 
Trial 4 581 1012 1443 1453 1473 
Trial 5 601 1012 1443 1453 1473 
"^erage 585 1013.8 1434.4 1448.4 1466.4 
Table A.5: Single machine environment. Mesured time (in ms) for "with 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 1 input, 1 cycle. 
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Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
Trial 1 1452 1492 1522 1562 1602 
Trial 2 1472 1512 1552 1582 1622 
Trial 3 1472 1512 1562 1602 1632 
Trial 4 1482 1522 1562 1592 1632 
Trial 5 1462 1502 1562 1592 1632 
-average 1468 1508 1552 1586 1 ‘ 
Table A.6: Single machine environment. Mesured time (in ms) for "with 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 100 inputs, 1 cycle. 
Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
Trial 1 2964 3385 3785 4196 4607 
Trial 2 2974 3385 3795 4206 4627 
Trial 3 2964 3375 3795 4206 4617 
Trial 4 3004 3395 3815 4226 4636 
Trial 5 2934 3335 3755 4166 4576 
"average 2968 3375 3789 4200 4612.6 
Table A.7: Single machine environment. Mesured time (in ms) for "with 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 1 input, 10000 cycles. 
Number of remote hosts 
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 — 
Trial 1 3025 3455 3886 4326 4747 
Trial 2 3035 3485 3926 4356 4807 
Trial 3 3044 3465 3895 4326 4756 
Trial 4 3034 3465 3915 4356 4777 
Trial 5 3064 3485 3916 4346 4777 
average I 3040.4 I 3471 I 3907.6 4342 4772.8 
Table A.8: Single machine environment. Mesured time (in ms) for "with 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 100 inputs, 10000 cycles. 
88 
Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 3 5 
Trial 1 I 101 I 181 ^ 
Trial 2 101 161 290 
Trial 3 100 200 250 
Trial 4 60 190 270 
Trial 5 100 190 250 
average 92.4 184.4 262.2 “ 
Table A.9: Two machines network. Mesured time (in ms) for "without 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 1 input, 1 cycle. 
Number of remote hosts 
1 I 3 5 
Trial 1 I 160 I 260 m 
Trial 2 150 250 361 
Trial 3 141 251 351 
Trial 4 131 261 371 
Trial 5 141 241 372 
average 144.6 252.6 364.8 一 
Table A.10: Two machines network. Mesured time (in ms) for "without 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 100 inputs, 1 cycle. 
Number of remote hosts 
1 I 3 5 
Trial 1 3525 5828 8152 
Trial 2 3516 5839 8172 
Trial 3 3465 5808 8152 
Trial 4 3465 5818 8152 
Trial 5 3495 5799 8162 
average o4yo.z 5818.4 8158 
Table A.11: Two machines network. Mesured time (in ms) for ”without 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 1 input, 10000 cycles. 
89 
Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 3 I 5 
Trial 1 3545 6119 ^ 
Trial 2 3755 6349 8743 
Trial 3 3565 6149 8783 
Trial 4 3786 6359 8933 
Trial 5 3755 6359 8933 
average 3681.2 6267 8863 ~ 
Table A.12: Two machines network. Mesured time (in ms) for "without 
using the protocol" setting. Parameters: 100 inputs, 10000 cycles. 
Number of remote hosts 
I 1 I 3 I 5 
Trial 1 I 180 I 480 M 
Trial 2 190 430 691 
Trial 3 270 440 771 
Trial 4 210 560 791 
Trial 5 220 540 801 
average 214 490 749 — 
Table A.13: Two machines network. Mesured time (in ms) for ”with using 
the protocol” setting. Parameters: 1 input, 1 cycle. 
Number of remote hosts 
1 I 3 5 
Trial 1 907 1873 2804 
Trial 2 892 1843 2814 
Trial 3 911 1873 2794 
Trial 4 922 1933 2984 
Trial 5 971 1952 2934 
average 920.6 1894.8 2866 “ 
Table A.14: Two machines network. Mesured time (in ms) for "with using 
the protocol" setting. Parameters: 100 inputs, 1 cycle. 
90 
Number of remote hosts 
1 I 3 5 
Trial 1 4737 8152 12277 
Trial 2 4727 8192 12148 
Trial 3 4657 8152 12308 
Trial 4 4706 8141 12298 
Trial 5 4717 8192 12197 
average 4708.8 8165.8 12245.6_ 
Table A.15: Two machines network. Mesured time (in ms) for "with using 
the protocol” setting. Parameters: 1 input, 10000 cycles. 
Number of remote hosts 
1 I 3 5 
Trial 1 5138 9965 13379 
Trial 2 5118 9935 13319 
Trial 3 5167 9834 13339 
Trial 4 5148 9964 13479 
Trial 5 5207 9914 13620 
average 5155.6 9922.4 13427.^ 
Table A.16: Two machines network. Mesured time (in ms) for "with using 
the protocol" setting. Parameters: 100 inputs, 10000 cycles. 
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